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The Legality of Extraterritorial Application of
Competition Law and the Need to Adopt a Unified
Approach
Thanh Phan
INTRODUCTION
In 2014, three of the world’s largest shipping companies, Maersk Line,
Mediterranean Shipping Company, and CMA CGM, planned to create a
joint venture to operate a network named “P3 Network.”1 The proposed
network would operate on three trade lanes: Asia-Europe, Trans-Pacific,
and Trans-Atlantic.2 Although the headquarters of each company and the
proposed joint venture were located outside Vietnamese territory, the three
companies submitted a merger notification to the Vietnam Competition
Authority (“VCA”), pursuant to article 20 of the Competition Law of
Vietnam.3 The discussion surrounding this joint venture contributed to a
long-standing debate in the VCA regarding the extraterritorial application
of the Competition Law of Vietnam.4 The debate honed in on one primary
issue: although the P3 Network was run by foreign-based companies
located outside Vietnam, the companies still sought approval from the
VCA.
The extraterritorial application of competition law is a controversial
issue not only in Vietnam, but also in other jurisdictions5—especially now,
Copyright 2016, by THANH PHAN.
 Transnational merger investigator at the Vietnam Competition Authority,
Ph.D. candidate at the University of Victoria, Law Faculty, Research Fellow at
Centre for Global Studies, University of Victoria, Canada, Sessional Instructor in
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1. CMA CGM, Maersk Line and MSC to Establish an Operational Alliance,
CMA CGM (June 18, 2013), https://www.cma-cgm.com/news/1/cma-cgm-maerskline-and-msc-to-establish-an-operational-alliance [https://perma.cc/9GES-LS6P].
2. Id.
3. Luật Cạnh Tranh [Competition Law], No. 27/2004/QH11 of Dec. 3, 2004
(Viet.).
4. See discussion infra Part II.D.
5. See discussion infra Part II.
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as multinational corporations (“MNCs”) have increasingly expanded their
power across countries under the shadow of globalization.6 As MNCs
transcend countries’ geographical borders, they face a problem in
determining which country’s law will apply to their cross-border
transactions. Generally, the national law of a country is applicable only
within that country’s territory.7 The application of a country’s law, however,
becomes more problematic when considering MNCs and cross-border
transactions, which potentially affect multiple countries. When international
cooperation surrounding these transactions is not available or too costly,
some countries respond by simply applying their own competition law.8
This extraterritorial application, however, can potentially harm cross-border
business transactions.9
The extraterritorial application of a country’s law is the unilateral effort
of a country to extend its jurisdiction to acts conducted in other countries.10
Although the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction of competition law11 is
criticized12 for seemingly undermining the territorial principle of
international law, the exercise of this jurisdiction is necessary when
countries are unable to reach an agreement regarding cross-border
transactions.

6. For example, Google bought Nokia in 2012. Microsoft to Acquire Nokia’s
Devices & Services Business, License Nokia’s Patents and Mapping Services,
MICROSOFT NEWS CTR. (Sept. 3, 2013), https://news.microsoft.com/2013/09/03
/microsoft-to-acquire-nokias-devices-services-business-license-nokias-patents-andmapping-services/#sm.000wamleu1dzpd51pdc1m3ai3r4ao [https://perma.cc/WBG5
-QBXB]. Walmart acquired Jet.com in 2016. Walmart Agrees to Acquire Jet.com,
One of the Fastest Growing e-Commerce Companies in the U.S., WALMART (Aug. 8,
2016), http://news.walmart.com/2016/08/08/walmart-agrees-to-acquire-jetcom-oneof-the-fastest-growing-e-commerce-companies-in-the-us [https://perma.cc/7DFXV7NR].
7. See discussion infra Part I.B.1.
8. See discussion infra Part II.
9. See discussion infra Part II.B, C.
10. See discussion infra Part I.A.
11. Rita Yi Man Li & Yi Lut Li, The Role of Competition Law: An Asian
Perspective, 9 ASIAN SOC. SCI. 47, 47 (2013).
12. See, e.g., discussion infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the arguments posed by
the Canadian government in the amicus brief submitted) and Part II.C (discussing
the arguments posed by the Japanese government in the amicus briefs submitted).
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Although many countries oppose the EACL, asserting that it violates
international law,13 others utilize the EACL but often in different ways.14
The international approach to the EACL is not unified and fails to recognize
that some countries still adopt a “double standard” for the EACL, which
occurs when one country opposes the application of another country’s law
within its territory but seeks to apply its own law to other countries
extraterritorially.15 This Article explains that the extraterritorial application
of competition law by a country16 to acts that occur outside its territory is
not contrary to international law if that application is properly limited. The
EACL should be the unilateral action of one country only when the affected
countries fail to find a common solution for a cross-border competition
issue. Ultimately, this Article further proposes a model that should be
applied to limit the extraterritorial jurisdiction of competition law. This
model would require a country to scrutinize the link between the alleged act
and its country and consider the interstate interests involved before deciding
to exercise its jurisdiction.
Part I of this Article discusses international law and the foundation of
the extraterritorial application of law. Part II surveys the EACL
approaches of four countries—Canada, the U.S., Japan, and Vietnam—
and illustrates that because the limit of international law on EACL is
unclear, countries impose their own limits. Finally, Part III proposes a
unified approach for all countries to use when considering the
extraterritorial application of competition law.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW FOUNDATION OF THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF LAW
Before surveying the EACL approaches of multiple countries, it is
important to understand the foundation of the EACL. This Part first discusses
the definition of “exterritorial” and the characteristics of completion law.
Then, this Part discusses the relationship between jurisdiction and territory, as
established by international law. Finally, this Part explains the landmark Lotus

13. For example, Canada and Japan made this assertion in amicus briefs
submitted to U.S. courts. See discussion infra Part II.A.1, II.C.; Brief for
Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1–2, United
States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997) (No. 96-2001), 1996
U.S. 1st Cir. Briefs LEXIS 11.
14. See discussion infra Part II.
15. For an example of a country that employs a “double standard” see
discussion infra Part II.C.
16. This country is normally referred to as the “country of forum.”
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case, in which the International Court of Justice held that a state may
exercise jurisdiction with respect to acts occurring in foreign countries.
A. The EACL in General
The extraterritorial application of competition law has several aspects
to consider. First, it is important to define “extraterritorial” and what it
means to apply a country’s law extraterritorially. Second, understanding
the EACL requires an understanding of the difference between the EACL
and conflict of laws. Finally, competition law involves characteristics of
both public and private law, which are important to understanding the
overall approach to the EACL.
1. Defining “Extraterritorial”
Many articles have discussed the “extraterritoriality” of the EACL.
Some authors treat extraterritoriality as the internationalization of
domestic law,17 while others simply define extraterritoriality as “the
application of domestic law to foreign conduct.”18 In the scholar Herbert
Hovenkamp’s discussion of antitrust law as an extraterritorial regulatory
policy, he does not expressly define “extraterritorial regulatory policy,” but
acknowledges the considerable power of U.S. antitrust law to control
conduct abroad.19 Another scholar David Gerber provides a more specific
definition of EACL, calling it “unilateral jurisdictionalism [that] authorizes
states to apply their own laws to conduct outside their territory under certain
conditions—without the obligation to take the interests of other states into
account.”20 Put simply, the EACL is best defined as the unilateral effort of
a country to extend its jurisdiction to acts conducted in other countries.21
Even the best definitions in the literature, however, fail to address important
issues related to the EACL.

17. See, e.g., GEORGE N. ADDY, CHRIS MARGISON & RYAN DOIG, NATIONAL
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAW: STRIKING THE
RIGHT BALANCE 1–2 (2004) (on file with Louisiana Law Review).
18. See, e.g., Allan E. Gotlieb, Extraterritoriality: A Canadian Perspective,
5 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 449, 449 (1983).
19. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust as Extraterritorial Regulatory Policy, 48
ANTITRUST BULL. 629, 629 (2003).
20. DAVID J. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION: LAW, MARKETS, AND
GLOBALIZATION 5 (2010).
21. See id.
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2. Distinguishing the EACL from Conflict of Laws
To avoid the conflation of the EACL and conflict of laws it is
important to distinguish the two. Conflict of laws is a country’s set of rules
which apply when a legal issue contains a foreign element and a domestic
court must decide whether to apply foreign law or cede jurisdiction to a
foreign court.22 Namely, conflict of laws deal with the following three
questions. First, does the court of a country have jurisdiction to hear the
case?23 Second, which country’s law should be applied to determine the
outcome of the dispute?24 Third, when should the court of a country
recognize and enforce a foreign judgment?25 Every modern legal system
has its own domestic conflict of laws rules.26 These domestic rules address
these three questions and help countries avoid conflicts and overlapping
jurisdiction in private litigation. Moreover, at the international level, many
countries have conventions that provide rules to determine the jurisdiction
of courts and the applicable laws in cases involving foreign elements.27
The difference between the EACL and conflict of laws hinges upon
their relation to public and private law. Conflict of laws relates to private
laws that regulate private relationships, while the EACL relates to public
law.28 Public law regulates the relationship between private persons and
the state acting in its capacity as mediator of the public good.29 Private
law, however, regulates relationships between private parties.30 This type
of law covers areas such as contracts, marriage, adoption, or certain torts.31
Positivists distinguish these two types of law as duty-imposing laws and
power-conferring laws.32 Public laws are duty-imposing laws, which
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2005).
MAEBH HARDING, CONFLICT OF LAWS 2 (5th ed. 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PRINCIPLES ON CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS
(2015); Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44
I.L.M. 1294; Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, Oct.
2, 1973, 11 I.L.M. 1283.
28. Kit Barker, Private Law: Key Encounters with Public Law, in PRIVATE
LAW: KEY ENCOUNTERS WITH PUBLIC LAW 3, 3–4 (Kit Barker & Darryn Jensen
eds., 2013).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 78 (1961).
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require human beings to do, or abstain from doing, certain actions.33 By
contrast, private laws are power-conferring laws, which “do not impose
duties or obligations”34 but instead “provide individuals with facilities for
realizing their wishes, by conferring legal powers upon them to create, by
certain specified procedures and subject to certain conditions, structures
of rights and duties within the coercive framework of the law.”35
Private international law provides rules to determine whether a court
in a cross-border case has territorial jurisdiction to recognize the power of
a party in a private relationship. If the court has jurisdiction, private
international law then provides rules to determine which country’s law
should apply and regulate said private relationship.36 Because private law
concerns the rights and obligations arising from private relationships,
countries normally do not fight for jurisdiction in these cases; rather,
countries seek solutions to facilitate litigation and achieve just outcomes
through private international law principles.37 The EACL, in contrast,
deals with public law which imposes duties on subjects. In cross-border
cases, the EACL addresses whether a country can impose a duty on a
person in a foreign territory.38 Thus, countries normally argue about
overlapping powers to impose a duty on a person in a certain territory.
3. Public and Private Law Aspects of Competition Law
Competition law has the characteristics of public law because
competition law imposes duties on subjects, such as the duty not to abuse
a dominant position, the duty not to enter into anticompetitive agreements,
the duty to comply with merger notification requirements, and the duty not
to engage in unfair trade practices. In most jurisdictions, the public law
character of competition law is also evident in the use of criminal or
administrative sanctions.39 Competition laws typically provide for a public
33. Id.
34. Id. at 27.
35. Id.
36. See HARDING, supra note 23.
37. In an effort to seek solutions, countries have created international
conventions. See, e.g., HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 27.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (1945);
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
39. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34, §45
(Can.); Shitekidokusen no Kinshi oyobi Kouseitorihiki no Kakuho nikansuru
Houritsu, [Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair
Trade] [Antimonopoly Act], Law No. 54 of 1947, art. 89–118 (Japanese Law
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mechanism, such as an administrative agency, to enforce laws and detect
violations of the law. In addition, there is no choice of law rule in
competition law, either under the laws of states or international
conventions.40 Competition laws do not provide rules allowing its courts to
apply foreign competition laws or rules to choose a forum in cases involving
foreign elements.41 Similarly, there is no convention that governs conflict of
competition law rules. Article 2(2)(h) of the Convention of 30 June 2005 on
Choice of Court Agreements even states that “[t]his Convention shall not
apply to . . . anti-trust (competition) matters.”42
Although competition law has many public law characteristics,
competition law in some jurisdictions has private law characteristics as
well. For example, in Canada and the U.S., private parties can make civil
claims for damages relating to violations of competition law. However,
allowing private litigation does not make competition law private law. In
Canada, only three sections of the Competition Act allow a private party
to bring a competition case to the Competition Tribunal.43 Additionally,
the private party must be granted leave under the Competition Act before
making such an application to the Competition Tribunal.44 The right of a
private party to make this application does not preclude the right of the
Competition Bureau45 to proceed against the violator to protect public
interest.46
Besides private rights of action provided by the three sections, the
Canadian Competition Act also allows a private party to recover damages
suffered as a result of offenses related to competition or to the failure of
any person to comply with an order of the Tribunal or other court under
the Act.47 Therefore, the private litigation in this situation stems from a
Translation [JLT DS]), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp [https://perma
.cc/2GWJ-C2FZ] (Japan).
40. See Hannah L. Buxbaum & Ralf Michaels, Jurisdiction and Choice of
Law in International Antitrust Law, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LITIGATION:
CONFLICT OF LAWS AND COORDINATION 225 (Jürgen Basedow et al., eds. 2012),
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3115&context=facu
lty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/XUC6-7337].
41. Id. at 226.
42. Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 27, at art.
2(2)(h).
43. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34, §§ 75–77 (Can.).
44. Id. § 103.1.
45. Our Organization, COMPETITION BUREAU OF CAN., http://www.competi
tionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/h_00125.html [https://perma.cc/6Y4N-H82
Q] (last updated Nov. 5, 2015).
46. Competition Act, §§ 75–77.
47. Id. § 36.
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public relationship between the state and the person who failed to comply
with the obligation prescribed by the Competition Act. Likewise, in the
United States, persons who violate the Sherman Act “shall be deemed
guilty of a felony.”48 Although violations of the Sherman Act may cause
damage to private parties, the violations are deemed to be contrary to
public interests. Therefore, the damages plaintiffs claim in competition
cases arise from the violation of a public obligation imposed by
competition law. The damages are private consequences of a violation of
a public obligation that is not established by any agreement between the
two parties, but by the law itself.
B. The Relation Between Territory and Jurisdiction
According to international law principles, a country’s laws usually
apply only within the country’s territory. In some instances, however, a
country should extend its competition law jurisdiction to certain acts that
occurred abroad. There are different situations in which an act that
occurred abroad has a connection to the territory of the country of forum.
Only some of these connections, however, are sufficient to trigger the
EACL.
1. Territorial Principle
The territory of a country is an important element of international law
in determining the sovereignty of a country. A country is obligated to
respect the territory and the sovereignty of other countries.49 This
territorial principle is universally recognized in international law.50 This
principle allows a country to freely make and enforce its law against any
entities, including foreign entities, operating or present in its territory.51
This principle also proscribes the enforcement of a country’s legislation in
another country without the reliance on a treaty.52 This principle fits with

48. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
49. JOHN H. CURRIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 335 (2d ed. 2008).
50. PETER MALANCZUK & MICHAEL BARTON AKEHURST, AKEHURST’S
MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 75–76 (Routledge 7th rev. ed.
1997).
51. AUST, supra note 22, at 44.
52. Id. at 45.
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legal positivism that asserts that “sovereignty means ultimate authority in
a given territory.”53
The territorial principle, however, indicates a rigid link between law
and territory, making the principle unsuitable when considering the
development of technology and international trade. For example, a pricefixing cartel might be conducted in one country but have consequences in
many other territories. Given the rigid link, there are several exceptions to
the territorial principle which allow affected countries to exercise
jurisdiction over certain acts that occurred abroad. One of these
exceptions, the effects doctrine, is suitable to consider when drafting a
unified approach to the EACL.
a. Protective Principle
The first exception to the territorial principle is the protective principle,
which allows a country to exercise jurisdiction over a crime committed
outside its territory when the crime threatens the country’s national
security.54 The scope of this principle is not clear, however, because national
security is a broad concept—one that might relate to economic or political
issues—and countries often disagree about economic or political national
security issues.55 Nevertheless, this protective principle should not apply to
the EACL because it relates to criminal law rather than competition law.
b. Universal Jurisdiction Principle
Another exception to the territorial principle is the universal
jurisdiction principle, which enables a country to claim jurisdiction over
persons whose alleged crimes were committed outside the boundaries of
that country, regardless of nationality, country of residence, or any other
nexus with the prosecuting country.56 This principle is limited to certain
53. TURAN KAYAOĞLU, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: SOVEREIGNTY AND EXTRA
TERRITORIALITY IN JAPAN, THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, AND CHINA 192 (reprint ed.
2013).
54. United Nations, Protective Principle, UNTERM, https://unterm.un.org
/UNTERM/Display/Record/UNHQ/NA?OriginalId=e13007c0bcc151378525724
1005cbc50 [https://perma.cc/295E-CHJE] (last visited Jan. 15, 2016).
55. See, e.g., Recent Development, Protective Principle of Jurisdiction
Applied to Uphold Statute Intended to Have Extraterritorial Effect, 62 COLUM. L.
REV. 371, 374–75 (1962) (criticizing a court’s finding of national security).
56. United Nations, Universal Jurisdiction, UNTERM, https://unterm.un.org
/UNTERM/Display/Record/UNHQ/NA?OriginalId=b0d82ed607beb0b8852570
1f0061aec9 [https://perma.cc/7VFF-5DGB] (last visited Jan. 15, 2016).
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crimes, such as piracy, slavery, torture, war crimes, genocide, and other
crimes against humanity under conventions, such as the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment of 198457 and Geneva Conventions of 1949.58 Similar to the
protective principle, the universal jurisdiction principle should not apply
to competition law because it is used to prosecute international crimes and
protect international human rights.59
c. Active Personality Principle
The third exception is the active personality principle. The active
personality principle, also known as the nationality principle, allows a
country to assert criminal jurisdiction over the conduct of its nation’s
citizens, even when the conduct occurred abroad.60 A state is not
constrained to enact laws that apply only to its citizens who commit
offenses within the country; a state may also enact laws that apply to the
conduct of its citizens abroad and may be enforced in the country’s home
courts. Such laws, however, cannot be enforced in another country unless
a treaty allows for their application because of the territorial principle.61
In competition law, two scenarios might raise questions about the
jurisdiction of a country over the anticompetitive business practices of its
citizens abroad. The first scenario involves a foreign-based subsidiary of
a national MNC. For example, a Canadian subsidiary of a U.S. MNC is
accused of abuse of a dominant position in Canada. One might argue that
a U.S. court should have jurisdiction in this case because the violation is
conducted by a U.S. company’s subsidiary, and the nationality principle
allows a state to regulate activities of its citizens abroad.62 However, the
nationality of the foreign-based subsidiary and that of its mother company
are different. The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in the Barcelona
Traction, Light and Power, Co. held that a company, of which the
shareholders are of Belgium nationality, “having been incorporated under
57. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
58. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
59. For critics of this principle see Jack Goldsmith & Stephen D. Krasner,
The Limits of Idealism, DAEDALUS, Winter 2003, at 47, 47–63.
60. United Nations, Active Personality, UNTERM, http://unterm.un.org
/UNTERM/Display/Record/UNHQ/NA?OriginalId=80aca4bc91d0e57c8525724
1006eba9e [https://perma.cc/7GFU-TQE3] (last visited Jan. 15, 2016).
61. AUST, supra note 22, at 45.
62. Id.
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Canadian law and having its registered office in Toronto . . . is of Canadian
nationality.”63 Therefore, despite the close relationship with a U.S. parent
company, a Canadian subsidiary is a Canadian corporation and the active
personality principle should not allow the U.S. to exercise its competition
law.
A second scenario involves the regulation of anticompetitive conduct
of citizens in a foreign territory. For example, the CEOs of two U.S.
corporations are both Canadian citizens, and they operate a price-fixing
cartel in the U.S., affecting only the U.S. market. Although the active
personality principle allows a state to regulate activities of its citizens
abroad, to enforce such regulation in a foreign territory is normally
controversial when a similar law and enforcement mechanism exist in the
foreign territory. Thus, although the two Canadian CEOs violated the
Canadian Competition Act, they are not harming the Canadian market and
U.S law is available to punish their offenses. In this scenario, the active
personality principle should not apply to allow Canada to assert
extraterritorial jurisdiction of its competition laws.
d. Passive Personality Principle
The passive personality principle, another exception to the territorial
principle, allows a country to claim jurisdiction over acts committed
abroad against its own citizens by foreign citizens.64 This principle
appeared in the late 19th century in the criminal codes of some countries
and triggered conflicts between states.65 This principle is primarily applied
in counterterrorism law and conventions.66
The passive personality principle may arguably allow a country to
enforce its competition law against the anticompetitive business practices
of foreign persons in a foreign territory that have adverse effects on the
country’s citizens in a foreign territory. For example, a U.S. company
might abuse its dominant position in the U.S. market and harm Canadian
companies doing business in the U.S. The Canadian Competition Act67
could possibily be enforced in the U.S. to protect the U.S.-based Canadian
63. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment,
1970 I.C.J. 3, 52 (Feb. 5).
64. Passive Personality, UNTERM, http://unterm.un.org/UNTERM/Display/Re
cord/UNHQ/NA?OriginalId=b0b4495bac9b98f785257241006f6956 [https://perma
.cc/Y4QT-H58D] (last visited Oct. 20, 2016).
65. John G. McCarthy, The Passive Personality Principle and Its Use in
Combatting International Terrorism, 13 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 298, 302 (1989).
66. AUST, supra note 22, at 45.
67. Id.
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companies from such violations. However, in this situation, the violation’s
connection to the Canadian Competition Act is weak, and U.S law is
available to regulate the abusive conduct. Therefore, the passive personality
principle should not apply to competition law.
e. Effects Doctrine
The final exception to the territorial principle is the effects doctrine.
This exception is arguably the only one that should apply to competition
law and should therefore be considered in drafting a unified approach to
the EACL. According to the effects doctrine, a country may enforce its
competition law against an anticompetitive business practice that took
place completely abroad if the conduct has a substantial effect on its
territory.68 The effects doctrine was adopted by the International Court of
Justice in the landmark Lotus case.69 As a result of this decision in 1927,
the effects doctrine has been applied by an increasing number of countries
in the area of competition law despite strong opposition from many other
countries.70
2. The International Court of Justice Judgment in Lotus
The extraterritorial principle is controversial and has been strongly
opposed by many countries. In 1927, the ICJ discussed a notable conflict
between France and Turkey in the Lotus case.71 In a milestone decision
concerning the EACL, the ICJ changed the international law approach to
the application of national law to violations conducted abroad.72
On August 2, 1926, a collision occurred between the French mail
steamer Lotus and the Turkish collier Boz-Kourt in the open sea.73 The
Boz-Kourt sank, and eight Turkish citizens died.74 Lieutenant Demons, a
68. Id. at 47.
69. Case of the Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.I.C.J. (ser. A) No.10,
at 19 (Sept. 7).
70. AUST, supra note 22, at 47.
71. See generally Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. At that time the Court was named the
Permanent Court of International Justice. See Permanent Court of International
Justice, INT’L CT. OF JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/ [https://perma.cc/4RUCX8SS] (last visited Oct. 20, 2016).
72. Although the ICJ’s judgements are not binding precedent, they are still
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. See Statute of the
International Court of Justice, arts. 38, 59, http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/?p1=
4&p2=2 [https://perma.cc/K96E-Z6HL].
73. Lotus, 1927 P.I.C.J., at 10.
74. Id.
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French citizen who was the watch officer on board the Lotus, was arrested by
the Turkish police and prosecuted by the public prosecutor of Stamboul.75
Demons argued that the Turkish court had no jurisdiction, but the Turkish
court dismissed his objection and sentenced him to imprisonment for 80 days
and a fine of 22 pounds.76
The French government protested the arrest of Demons and sought to
transfer the case from Turkish courts to French courts.77 The Turkish and
French governments then agreed to bring the question of jurisdiction to the
ICJ, previously called the “Permanent Court of International Justice.”78
One of the questions the Court had to decide was whether Turkey “acted
in conflict with the principles of international law.”79 The French
government asked the ICJ to rule that the “jurisdiction to entertain criminal
proceedings against the officer of the watch of a French ship, in connection
with the collision which occurred on the high seas between that vessel and
a Turkish ship, belongs exclusively to the French Courts.”80 The Turkish
government simply asked the ICJ to grant jurisdiction to the Turkish
courts.81
The French government argued that international law did not allow a
state to take proceedings with regard to offenses committed by foreigners
abroad simply by reason of the victim’s nationality when the offense was
committed on board the French vessel.82 On the other hand, the Turkish
government argued that “no principle of international criminal law exists
which would debar Turkey from exercising the jurisdiction which she
clearly possesses to entertain an action for damages, [and thus] that
country has jurisdiction to institute criminal proceedings.”83
The Court observed that “the first and foremost restriction imposed by
international law upon a State is that—failing the existence of a permissive
rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its power in any form in the
territory of another State.”84 This means that a state cannot exercise its
jurisdiction outside its territory without permission of an international rule.
The Court, however, went on to say, “[i]t does not . . . follow that
international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its own
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 18.
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territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken
place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of
international law.”85 The ICJ then proceeded to ascertain the possible
international rule that would prohibit Turkey from prosecuting Demons. It
observed that:
Consequently, once it is admitted that the effects of the offence
[sic] were produced on the Turkish vessel, it becomes impossible
to hold that there is a rule of international law which prohibits
Turkey from prosecuting Lieutenant Demons because of the fact
that the author of the offence [sic] was on board the French ship.86
In response to the French government’s assertion of exclusive jurisdiction
over French territory, the ICJ said that:
If, therefore, a guilty act committed on the high seas produces its
effects on a vessel flying another flag or in foreign territory, the
same principles must be applied as if the territories of two different
States were concerned, and the conclusion must therefore be drawn
that there is no rule of international law prohibiting the State to
which the ship on which the effects of the offence [sic] have taken
place belongs, from regarding the offence [sic] as having been
committed in its territory and prosecuting, accordingly, the
delinquent.87
The Lotus judgment provides three notable points regarding the
extraterritorial application of a state’s public law. First, a state can apply
its law extraterritorially unless constrained by an international rule.88 The
ICJ’s approach contradicted the argument of countries that oppose the
application, particularly the French government’s position that a state can
apply its law extraterritorially only when the state cites an international
rule that allows such an application.89 This rule means that the
extraterritorial application of a nation’s public law is a natural right of
states—not a right that derives from permission of any international treaty.
The ICJ emphasized that “all that can be required of a State is that it should
not overstep the limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction;

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 19.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id. at 6.
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within these limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its
sovereignty.”90
Second, the judgment made a clear distinction between prescriptive,
adjudicative, and enforcement jurisdictions over an act conducted abroad.91
Prescriptive jurisdiction refers to the power to prescribe rules regulating
foreign conduct.92 Adjudicative jurisdiction is the power to subject foreign
parties to judicial process.93 Finally, enforcement jurisdiction is the
jurisdiction to enforce law abroad.94 Thus, according to the ICJ’s judgment,
states are relatively free to make laws that regulate foreign conduct because
the prescriptive jurisdiction is conducted within a country’s territory.
Likewise, because the adjudicative jurisdiction is mostly exercised within
the territory of the country that made the law, it is not prohibited by the Lotus
judgment. The enforcement jurisdiction is more limited because this
exercise of jurisdiction may violate the territorial principle.95 Enforcement
jurisdiction is allowed only if it is conducted within the territory of the
country that made the law.96
However, these three jurisdictions are inseparable, and the limit placed
on enforcement jurisdiction also influences the scope of the prescriptive
and adjudicative jurisdictions. In competition law, without the cooperation
or approval of the country where the conduct occurred, a second country
could not obtain the information needed to enforce its competition laws
extraterritorially. Consequently, although a country may have prescriptive
and adjudicative jurisdiction within its territory, its authority to address a
breach of its competition laws in a foreign country can be difficult.
Therefore, the exercise of prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdictions is not
unlimited.
The third notable point on the EACL made in Lotus relates to the effect
of foreign conduct on the country whose laws were violated. This rule can
be regarded as a limit set by international law on the freedom of a country
to exercise jurisdiction within its territory with respect to conduct that
occurred in a foreign country. According to the ICJ, “it might be observed
that the effect is a factor of outstanding importance in offences [sic] such
as manslaughter, which are punished precisely in consideration of their
90. Id. at 19.
91. Anthony J. Colangelo, What is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 99 CORNELL
L. REV. 1303 (2014).
92. Id. at 1303–04.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See KAYAOĞLU, supra note 53, at 129. See also Case of the Lotus (Fr. v.
Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.I.C.J. (ser. A) No.10, at 19 (Sept. 7).
96. Lotus, 1927 P.I.C.J., at 19.
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effects rather than of the subjective intention of the delinquent.”97 From
the private actor’s perspective, the ICJ’s judgment imposes an obligation
on entities residing in a country to comply not only with the laws of that
country, but with applicable foreign laws as well. In competition law,
MNCs are likely to be aware of this obligation because their business
decisions made in a particular country may have adverse effects in other
countries. A MNC that fails to consider the application of the competition
laws of countries affected by its business decisions might find itself subject
to unpredicted foreign competition law judgments.
In summary, the ICJ ruling in Lotus allows a state to exercise
jurisdiction with respect to acts occurring in foreign countries. Following
Lotus, countries have applied the ICJ’s judgment differently to extend their
jurisdiction to acts occurring abroad. To promote cooperative international
relations between countries and to enhance the certainty of the crossborder legal environment for entities, this right must be limited.
II. A GLOBAL SURVEY: VARIOUS APPROACHES TO THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF COMPETITION LAW
The limit of international law on the EACL is uncertain. Due to this
uncertainty, countries have imposed their own limits. An analysis of Canada
and the United States illustrates the approaches of two predominantly
common law countries and highlights the substantive differences between
their approaches. An analysis of the Japanese and Vietnamese approaches
to the EACL illustrates the approaches of two non-common law countries.
The discussion of Japan highlights the double standard in the EACL that
exists in some countries. The discussion of Vietnam serves as an example
of a developing country’s approach to the EACL.
A. The Canadian Approach
Canada is a country that takes a restrictive view of the territorial
doctrine and is concerned about the negative effects of the EACL,
especially the EACL by U.S. courts. Scholars acknowledge that the
Canadian economy is especially vulnerable to the unwarranted exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction.98 In addition to problems concerning Canadian
sovereignty and the security of Canadian entities, the unilateral EACL by

97. Id. at 24.
98. Gotlieb, supra note 18, at 457.
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foreign states in Canadian territory might impair certain Canadian policies,
such as the immunity program.99
1. The Opposition of Canada to the Exercise of Foreign Jurisdiction
in Canadian Territory
In response to the adverse effects of the overuse of foreign
extraterritoriality, Canadian provincial legislatures have enacted several
statutes to block the foreign EACL.100 First, under the Ontario Business
Records Protection Act, the attorney general may obtain a court order
prohibiting a person from removing a business record101 of any business
carried on in Ontario pursuant to an order made by a foreign authority.102
The taking of such a business record is legal only if it is consistent with
the company’s legal practice or is allowed by Ontario or Canadian law.103
The Quebec Business Concerns Record Act sets out the same rule.104
Ignoring the relationship between Ontario or Quebec and other Canadian
provinces, this regulation serves to strengthen the territorial principle and
weaken the EACL of other countries within Canadian territory. In Canada,
the unilateral order of an authority in a foreign jurisdiction outside Ontario
or Quebec is regarded as the exercise of jurisdiction by a foreign country,
and according to the principle in Lotus, this type of order is likely
prohibited by international law.105 Therefore, Canadian law, unable to
impose a duty on foreign authorities, prohibits Canadian entities from
complying with a foreign authority’s unilateral order for documents.
These blocking provisions are consistent with the judgment in Lotus.
Requesting a foreign-based company to submit a document without the
approval of the country of conduct is an exercise of power in the territory
of another state. Such a request, therefore, is prohibited by international
99. ADDY, MARGISON & DOIG, supra note 17, at 17. For more on the immunity
program see Immunity Program Under the Competition Act, COMPETITION BUREAU
OF CAN. (Aug. 4. 2009), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng
/03155.html [https://perma.cc/S94Q-BULB].
100. ADDY, MARGISON & DOIG, supra note 17, at 5.
101. According to section 1 of the Business Records Protection Act, business
records include “any account, balance sheet, profit and loss statement or inventory
or any resume or digest thereof or any other record, statement, report, or material.”
Business Records Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.19, § 1 (Can.).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Business Concerns Record Act, C.Q.L.R. 2011, c D-12 (Can.).
105. For more on the nature of international law see ROSALYN HIGGINS,
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 1–16 (2003).
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law. Moreover, the obligation not to transfer a business record, as provided
by the business records legislation, is the right of Canadian-based
companies to refuse EACL. Accordingly, any foreign authority that wants
to legally obtain business records from Ontario or Quebec has to comply with
procedures allowed by the laws of these provinces or the parliament of
Canada.
The Ontario and Quebec blocking provisions are also consistent with Part
III of the Competition Act of Canada providing for mutual legal assistance.
These provisions enhance Canadian sovereignty in multi-jurisdictional
competition cases. According to section 30.03 of the Competition Act of
Canada, a foreign state that has entered into a mutual assistance agreement106
can make a request for assistance pursuant to the agreement.107 This section
authorizes the minister of justice to handle such requests.108 If the minister of
justice approves the request for a search and seizure, the minister of justice
shall provide the commissioner with any documents or information
necessary to apply for the search warrant.109
Federal legislation also protects Canada from the potential negative
effects of the EACL and helps strengthen Canadian sovereignty. For
example, Section 8 of the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act provides
that where the recognition or enforcement of a foreign tribunal’s judgment
in Canada has or is likely to have adverse effects on Canadian interests or
sovereignty, the attorney general of Canada may “declare that the
judgment shall not be recognized or enforceable in any manner in Canada”
or, in the case of a money judgement, may decrease the amount owed.110
In addition, section 9(1) empowers a Canadian citizen to sue and recover
from a person in whose favor the abovementioned foreign judgment is
given.111 Thus besides allowing the attorney general to declare a foreign
judgment unenforceable in Canada, the Act provides measures for the
Canadian resident to recover the damages and expenses incurred related to
such a judgment.112 Section 9(2) allows the court to order the seizure and
sale of any property in which the person against whom the judgment made
under section 9(1) is rendered.113
106. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34 § 30 (Can.) (defining agreement as
“a treaty, convention or other international agreement to which Canada is a party
that provides for mutual legal assistance in competition matters”).
107. Id. § 30.03.
108. Id.
109. Id. § 30.05.
110. Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C. 1985, c F-29, § 8 (Can.).
111. Id. § 9(1).
112. Id. § 9(2).
113. Id.
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In addition to legislation, the Canadian government has resisted the
EACL on a case-by-case basis. In Hartford Fire Insurance v. California,114
heard by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1992, the Canadian government
submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of a petitioner.115 Canada was
“concerned with the exercise of U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction where it
directly conflicts with the exercise of Canada’s territorial jurisdiction.”116
The Canadian government first argued against the extraterritorial exercise
of the Sherman Act117 by asserting that “[c]ustomary international law,
which has been adopted as U.S. law, precludes one state’s exercise of
economic regulatory jurisdiction over acts occurring in the territory of
another state where such exercise would cause a substantial conflict.”118
The Canadian government then argued using the presumption against the
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Sherman Act, claiming that “[n]either
the plain language nor the legislative history of the Sherman Act
demonstrates a congressional intent to apply it extraterritorially so as to
conflict with and undermine another sovereign’s territorial laws.”119 The
final argument made by the Canadian government was that the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, which amended the Sherman
Act, does not express an intent to override the territorial preference in
situations of legal conflict under U.S. and international law.120 This case,
in addition to legislation, illustrates Canada’s opposition to the EACL in
Canada.
2. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the Canadian Competition Act
Although Canada opposes the EACL in Canada, Canada sometimes
wishes to apply its laws extraterritorially. The extraterritorial jurisdiction
of the Canadian Competition Act, however, is not clearly stated.121
Sections that define violations of the Act—for example, conspiracies

114. Hartford Fire Ins., Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
115. Brief for Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae Supporting Certain
Petitioners, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (No. 911111, 91-1128), 1992 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 728.
116. Id. at *4.
117. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012).
118. Brief for Government of Canada at 13, Hartford, 509 U.S. 764 (No. 91111, 91-1128).
119. Id. at 23.
120. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6A
(2012).
121. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34 (Can.).
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between competitors,122 bid-rigging,123 deceptive marketing practices,124
restrictive trade practices,125 or mergers126—use words such as “person,”
“every person,” “every one,” or “any person” to describe the subject of the
conduct. These words refer to individuals and corporations127 in general,
regardless of nationality or place of residence. Without clear language or
a clear statement of territorial jurisdiction, it is difficult to determine
whether the Act applies to conduct that occurs outside of Canadian
territory. Another provision, section 46, provides some guidance in
making the determination of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Section 46, pertaining to foreign directive, seems to relate to acts
occurring outside of Canada. This section provides
[a]ny corporation, wherever incorporated, that carries on business in
Canada and that implements, in whole or in part in Canada, a
directive, instruction, intimation of policy or other communication to
the corporation or any person from a person in a country other than
Canada who is in a position to direct or influence the policies of the
corporation, which communication is for the purpose of giving effect
to a conspiracy, combination, agreement or arrangement entered into
outside Canada that, if entered into in Canada, would have been in
contravention of section 45, is, whether or not any director or officer
of the corporation in Canada has knowledge of the conspiracy,
combination, agreement or arrangement, guilty of an indictable
offence and liable on conviction to a fine in the discretion of the
court.128
According to the plain language of this section, the alleged person is liable
under this section only if the person “carries on business in Canada,”129
but the Competition Act does not define what it means to “carry on
business in Canada.” Therefore, the possible interpretation of the
extraterritorial application depends on the guidance defining this phrase.
If “carry on business in Canada” means having a permanent
establishment in Canada, section 46 of the Competition Act does not have
extraterritorial application. According to the Convention between Canada
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. § 45.
Id. § 47.
Id. § 74.01.
Id. §§ 74–79.
Id. § 91.
Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c I-21, § 35(1) (Can.).
Competition Act, § 46.
Id.
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and the United States of America With Respect to Taxes on Income and
on Capital, “the term ‘permanent establishment’ means a fixed place of
business through which the business of a resident of a Contracting State is
wholly or partly carried on.”130 This Convention also provides that, “[t]he
term ‘permanent establishment’ shall include especially: (a) A place of
management; (b) A branch; (c) An office; (d) A factory; (e) A workshop;
and (f) A mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry or any other place of extraction
of natural resources.”131
Canadian tax law indicates that “carry on business in Canada” might
have a broader meaning than having a permanent establishment in Canada.
Section 253(b) of the Income Tax Act provides,
[W]here in a taxation year a person who is a non-resident
person . . . solicits orders or offers anything for sale in Canada
through an agent or servant, whether the contract or transaction is
to be completed inside or outside Canada or partly in and partly
outside Canada . . . the person shall be deemed, in respect of the
activity or disposition, to have been carrying on business in
Canada in the year.132
In Maya Forestales S.A. v The Queen, the Tax Court of Canada,
commenting on this section of the Income Tax Act, observed that “it is quite
clear that Parliament’s intent in creating the presumption was to subject nonresident persons to Canadian tax provided they carry out a minimum amount
of commercial activity within Canada’s borders.”133 The court then
concluded that “the purpose of section 253 is to extend Canada’s tax
jurisdiction to non-resident persons based on certain activities that they carry
out within Canada’s borders.”134 The tax court’s judgement in Maya
Forestales means that a person is considered carrying on business in
Canada only if that person at least conducts a commercial activity within
Canadian territory. In this situation, section 46 of the Competition Act
does not have extraterritorial jurisdiction. However, given the
development of technology, an offer, an order, or a commercial activity
might be made from a foreign country to Canadian buyers online.
Therefore, with online activity, the phrase “carry on business in Canada”
may be interpreted more broadly. If the phrase included business activities
130. Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Can.-U.S.,
art. V(1), Sept. 26, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11087.
131. Id. at art. V(2).
132. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c L-1 (5th Supp.), § 253 (Can.).
133. Maya Forestales S.A. v. The Queen, 2005 T.C.C. 66, para. 34 (Can.).
134. Id. at para. 36.
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that are conducted outside Canadian territory, but affect Canada, section
46 would have extraterritorial application.
Additionally, section 109 and section 110 on merger notification may
provide a clearer rule concerning the extraterritorial application of the
Competition Act. These sections require participants to a merger to submit
a merger notification to the Competition Bureau if the merger meets
certain criteria. Parties to mergers who had more than 400 million dollars
in aggregate assets or aggregate gross revenue from sales in, from, or into
Canada at a predetermined time are subject to the requirement of merger
notification under the Competition Act.135 Section 110 provides the
transaction’s size threshold for different types of mergers. The threshold
relies on the aggregate value of the assets of participating parties together
with their affiliates in Canada, among others.136
These regulations indicate that the Competition Act of Canada might
have extraterritorial application. Under sections 109 and 110, the Act may
regulate mergers conducted outside Canadian territory that affect Canada
through a corporation that carries on an operating business in Canada. For
example, suppose A and B are U.S. companies, and A acquires B in the
U.S. A and B may have to send notification of the merger to the Canadian
commissioner if the parties meet the size criteria set out in section 109 and
the assets of B1, a Canadian affiliate controlled by B, exceed $700
million.137 This acquisition is conducted by U.S. companies within the
territory of the U.S., and B1 is a Canadian company which does not
participate in the acquisition. The acquisition has effects on the Canadian
market because the decisions of B1 might be influenced by the postmerger companies. Sections 109 and 110, therefore, mean that the
Competition Act to some extent might have extraterritorial application.138
The Competition Bureau, however, does not enforce the Competition
Act unilaterally in cross-border merger cases. The Bureau provided in a
submission to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (“OECD”) that the Bureau often seeks extensive
cooperation with foreign competition authority in reviewing transnational

135. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34, § 109(1) (Can.).
136. Id. §§ 110(3)–(4).
137. See id. §§ 110(7)–(8).
138. McMillan LLP takes the same point of view that “foreign-to-foreign
mergers might be subject to substantive review wherever they occur, if
competitive effects occur within Canada from the transaction.” Neil Campbell,
James B. Musgrove & Mark Opashinov, Canada, in GETTING THE DEAL
THROUGH: MERGER CONTROL 2012, at 82, 83 (John Davies ed., 2011).
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mergers.139 The Bureau is also willing to coordinate with foreign
counterparts when a cross-border merger is likely to have adverse
competitive effects in the related countries.140 The Bureau asserts that
consistent and coordinated remedies help avoid potential friction
stemming from situations in which a remedy in one jurisdiction may not
be acceptable in another and can lead to more efficient and effective
resolutions than would be attained through unilateral enforcement
action.141
In practice, the Canadian Competition Tribunal has discussed the
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Canadian Competition Act in Director
of Investigation and Research v. D & B Companies of Canada Ltd.
(“D&B”).142 In D&B, the petitioner alleged that the respondent abused a
dominant position in the supply of scanner-based market tracking services
in Canada.143 Although this case does not directly involve extraterritorial
jurisdiction, the Tribunal mentions the issue in the discussion of the
geographic dimension of the market.144 The Tribunal referred to the
discussion of one scholar145 regarding the need to extend “the reach of the
Canadian abuse of dominance provisions to assert extraterritorial
jurisdiction in cases in which the ‘foreign commerce of Canada’ is
adversely affected.”146 Justice McKeown, writing for the Tribunal,
observed,
If Parliament had simply referred in paragraph (a) [of section 79(1)]
to control of a market, “market” having both product and
geographic dimensions, the section could apply to situations where
there were [sic] no direct connection to Canadian consumers. It
could have been used for aggressive, extraterritorial application to

139. Government of Canada, Competition Bureau Submission to the OECD
Competition Committee Roundtable on Remedies in Cross-Border Merger Cases,
COMPETITION BUREAU (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic
/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03771.html [https://perma.cc/GPU9-8KKS].
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Dir. of Investigation & Res. v. D & B Cos. of Can., 1995 CarswellNat
2684 (Can.) (WL).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 36.
145. R.J. Roberts, Abuse of Dominant Position: From Bork to Bain and Back
Again (But this Time with Extraterritoriality), in CANADIAN COMPETITION LAW
AND POLICY AT THE CENTENARY, 337, 344–48 (R.S. Khemani & W.T. Stanbury
eds., 1991).
146. D & B Cos. of Can., 1995 CarswellNat 2684, at para. 36.
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protect Canadian firms operating in other markets in which
Canadian consumers do not buy the product.147
Justice McKeown then wrote, “I am here concerned, however, with the
current wording, not the merits of the proposed reform.”148 This means the
Tribunal relied on the text of section 79(1)(a). Although D&B did not
focus on the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Canadian Competition Act,
the discussion of the Tribunal expressed a point of view consistent with
the territorial principle.
Although the Supreme Court of Canada has not heard any competition
case concerning the question of the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the
Competition Act, its approach to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of Canada
reflected in criminal cases is cautious. The Court’s opinion in criminal
cases suggests its potential approach to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of
the Canadian Competition Act. The Supreme Court of Canada in general
scrutinizes the territorial principle and the international comity while
deciding the jurisdiction of Canadian courts in cross-border cases. In 2007,
the Court emphasized in R v. Hape that Canadian law cannot be enforced
in another state’s territory without the other state’s consent.149 This is a
strict approach to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of Canadian law. In 1985,
Justice La Forest wrote in Libman v. The Queen that:
The territorial principle in criminal law was developed by the
courts to respond to two practical considerations, first, that a
country has generally little direct concern for the actions of
malefactors abroad; and secondly, that other states may
legitimately take umbrage if a country attempts to regulate matters
taking place wholly or substantially within their territories. For
these reasons the courts adopted a presumption against the
application of laws beyond the realm . . . .150
The Court also acknowledged the necessity of the extraterritorial
jurisdiction of law.151 It observed that confining national criminal law to
national territory would have provided an easy escape for international
criminals.152 Justice La Forest asserted that “[t]his country has a legitimate
interest in prosecuting persons for activities that take place abroad but have
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at para. 37.
Id.
R. v. Hape, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, 294 (Can.).
Libman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R 178, 208 (Can.).
Id.
Id.
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an unlawful consequence here.”153 He also laid out the substantial links
principle, providing that courts should “consider the substantial links that
connected the crime to that jurisdiction” when determining whether a
crime should be prosecuted in a particular area.154
Thus, the opinions on the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction of the
Canadian Supreme Court seem to be strict and consistent over time. As a
general rule, Canadian laws cannot be enforced in another country’s
territory, but they can have extraterritorial jurisdiction in some specific
situations. The justification for the Canadian courts to exercise its jurisdiction
extraterritorially is the “unlawful consequence”155 or “substantial link”156
between the act occurring abroad and Canada.
However, among the cross-border cases Canadian courts have heard,
there is no case involving an offense by a foreigner in a foreign territory
that has an adverse effect on Canada. The substantial links principle,
therefore, has not brought about any controversy over the jurisdiction of a
Canadian court like that of the effects doctrine in Lotus. Even in Libman,
in which a significant portion of the offense involved conduct in Canada
even though the victims were harmed abroad, the link between the crime
and Canada was obviously substantial.157
In 1997, the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. O.B.158 dealt with the
question of “whether a Canadian court has jurisdiction to try the appellant
for an offence [sic] committed entirely in the United States.”159 In this
case, the appellant was charged with “touching his granddaughter’s body
for a sexual purpose” in his transport truck during a trip from Canada to
the U.S.160 The offense was conducted entirely in the United States
territory.161 Justice Abella observed that
[t]he offence [sic] was one which in every respect occurred
outside Canada, albeit in a Canadian vehicle on a trip from Canada
with two Canadians in it. Other than in s. 7, the Criminal Code
does not purport to assume original jurisdiction over criminal
activity in foreign territories simply because the activity was
carried on by Canadians in a Canadian vehicle. There must be
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 209.
Id. at 188.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 188.
Id.
R. v B., 1997 CarswellOnt 1740 (Can.) (WL).
Id. at para. 1.
Id. at para. 2.
Id. at para. 3.
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more than Canadian residence or vehicular ownership; there must
be a significant link between Canada and the formulation,
initiation, or commission of the offence. There is no such link here
with respect to any part of the offence.162
Justice Abella then concluded that the Canadian court had no jurisdiction
to try the appellant.163 In this case, the Ontario Court of Appeal did not
apply the active personality principle to grant Canadian courts jurisdiction.
This decision by the appellate court suggests that the nationality of the
violator alone is not a sufficient substantial link to confer jurisdiction on a
Canadian court.
Canada has consistently favored a largely territorial approach to the
enforcement of the Canadian Competition Act. The Supreme Court,
however, has allowed extraterritorial application in criminal cases where the
acts in question have substantial links to Canada.164 Although “substantial
links” is not well-defined, it requires more than the mere involvement of a
Canadian citizen. Therefore, the extraterritorial application of the
Competition Act is still uncertain; sections 109 and 110, however, provide
the best support for extraterritorial application, as the Competition Bureau
and courts have the power under these sections to govern mergers that take
place abroad by foreign corporations if the mergers meet certain criteria.165
If Canada chooses to enforce extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Competition
Act in the future, it should reconsider the blocking statutes and the Foreign
Extraterritorial Measures Act,166 as these statutes would conflict with the
Competition Act’s extraterritorial jurisdiction and create a double standard
regarding the EACL in Canada.
B. The American Approach
The U.S. is a country that vigorously exercises extraterritorial
jurisdiction in the area of antitrust law.167 However, there are divergent
opinions and practices related to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of antitrust
law in the United States. The divergence stems from the unclear statement
of the law. This section analyzes the U.S. approach to the EACL,
especially how U.S. courts limit the effects doctrine by taking into account
foreign country interests, international comity, and sovereign immunity.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at para. 12.
Id. at para. 13.
Libman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R 178, 188 (Can.).
Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34, §§ 109, 110 (Can.).
Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C. 1985, c F-29, § 8 (Can.).
Competition law is called “antitrust law” in the U.S.
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This section also discusses the application of foreign competition law in
U.S. territory.
1. The Territorial Principle and Presumption Against the
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the Sherman Act
U.S. antitrust law includes a number of statutes, with the three primary
statutes being the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade
Commission Act.168 The Sherman Act proscribes collusion and
monopolization.169 Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that “[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal.”170 Section 2 of the Sherman Act states
that “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”171 Likewise, the Clayton Act
defines “commerce” to mean “trade or commerce among the several States
and with foreign nations.”172 Although this definition of “commerce”
refers to trade or commerce “with foreign nations,” it is not clear whether
“commerce” includes violations conducted entirely abroad by foreign
individuals or entities or whether there should be at least one U.S. citizen
involved in the alleged conduct. Similarly, the extent to which the
Sherman Act will apply to acts conducted abroad is also unclear.
In his discussion about the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Sherman
Act, one commentator, Larry Kramer, asserted that “Congress seldom
thinks about questions of extraterritoriality, which is why so few federal
statutes address it.”173 William Dodge takes a different approach, arguing
that “acts of Congress should presumptively apply only to conduct that
causes effects within the United States regardless of where that conduct

168. The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/U3
TQ-VBCB] (last visited Oct. 20, 2016).
169. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012).
170. Id. § 1.
171. Id. § 2.
172. Id. § 12.
173. Larry Kramer, Extraterritorial Application of American Law After the
Insurance Antitrust Case: A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM.
J. INT’L L. 750, 757 (1995).
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occurs.”174 Because the intention of the Congress is unclear, the courts must
fill the gap.175
The first case in which the U.S. Supreme Court addressed
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act was American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co.176 in 1909. In this case, both the plaintiff and defendant
were U.S. corporations, but the alleged monopolization occurred in Panama
and Costa Rica.177 In hearing the plaintiff’s appeal, the Court observed that
“the acts causing the damage were done, so far as appears, outside the
jurisdiction of the United States and within that of other states. It is
surprising to hear it argued that they were governed by the act of
Congress.”178 This observation implies that the American Banana Court
presumed that the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act was confined to the
territory of the U.S. The Court then concluded that
it alleges no case under the act of Congress, and discloses nothing
that we can suppose to have been a tort where it was done. A
conspiracy in this country to do acts in another jurisdiction does
not draw to itself those acts and make them unlawful, if they are
permitted by the local law.179
Therefore, the Court’s opinion indicates that the U.S. does not apply the
active personality and passive personality principles to the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction of American antitrust laws.
Four years after American Banana, the Court slightly changed its
interpretation of the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act in U.S.
v. Pacific and Arctic Railway Navigation Co.180 In this case, the
defendants, which included a U.S. corporation and a Canadian
corporation, engaged in a combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade
and commerce with one another.181 The cartel effectively eliminated and
destroyed competition in the business of transporting freight and
passengers between various ports in the U.S. and Canada.182 The
defendants contended that U.S. antitrust law did not apply because part of
174. William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 90 (1998).
175. Kramer, supra note 173, at 757.
176. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
177. Id. at 354.
178. Id. at 355.
179. Id. at 359.
180. United States v. Pac. & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913).
181. Id. at 88.
182. Id.
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the transportation route was outside the U.S,183 but the Court rejected this
argument.184 It observed that “it was a control to be exercised over
transportation in the United States, and, so far, is within the jurisdiction of
the laws of the United States, criminal and civil.”185 The Court then
claimed jurisdiction over the foreign defendant asserting that “[i]f we may
not control foreign citizens or corporations operating in foreign territory,
we certainly may control such citizens and corporations operating in our
territory, as we undoubtedly may control our own citizens and our own
corporations.”186
Although the Supreme Court in Pacific and Arctic asserted that it may
not control foreign corporations operating in foreign territory, it held, in
contrast to American Banana, that jurisdiction under the Sherman Act is
not confined to U.S. territory.187 Although the alleged collusion was
conducted only partly within U.S. territory, the Court concluded that the
conduct was entirely within the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act. 188 This
finding suggests that jurisdiction under the Sherman Act extends to a
violation of the act that is, at least in part, conducted abroad. However, in
Pacific and Arctic, there was at least some connection to the U.S.—the
foreign defendant colluded with a U.S. corporation and the business of the
foreign defendant was conducted partly in the U.S. This connection might
explain why the Court did not provide extensive reasons justifying its
divergence from the American Banana approach to jurisdiction under the
Sherman Act.
2. The Effects Doctrine and the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the
Sherman Act
Although the Supreme Court in American Banana asserted that acts
conducted abroad are outside the jurisdiction of the U.S., this interpretation
has not been strictly followed by lower courts. In 1945, the Court of Appeal
for the Second Circuit outlined an “effects” test for determining the
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act in United States v.
Aluminum Company of America (“Alcoa”).189 In this case, the defendants

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 105.
Id. at 106.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 105–06.
Id.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (1945).
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entered into agreements to form cartels in 1931190 and 1936,191 which were
alleged to have had an adverse competitive effect on the U.S. market.
Judge Learned Hand, in delivering the opinion of the court, wrote that “we
are concerned only with whether Congress chose to attach liability to the
conduct outside the United States of persons not in allegiance to it.”192
Judge Hand referred to American Banana to illustrate that Congress did
not intend to punish all whom its courts could catch for conduct that had
no consequence within the United States. He then asserted that “[o]n the
other hand, it is settled law . . . that any state may impose liabilities, even
upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that
has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends; and these
liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize.”193
Judge Hand proposed two conditions to consider when determining
whether an act conducted abroad falls under the jurisdiction of the
Sherman Act. First, there must be an intent to affect U.S. imports.194 A
cartel entered into outside U.S. territory might affect U.S. trade even if the
parties did not intend to do so; these effects might result indirectly through
international trade. Analyzing this first condition, Judge Hand stated that
the Sherman Act was enacted to cover agreements that intend to affect
U.S. trade.195 Second, there must be an actual effect upon imports into the
United States.196 Judge Hand refers to an example of cartels that were
entered into with the intent to affect imports entering the U.S. but which
had no actual effect upon the imports.197 Following this example, Judge
Hand asserted that “the [Sherman] Act does not cover agreements, even
though intended to affect imports or exports, unless its performance is
shown actually to have had some effect upon them.”198 Therefore, under
this test, when both conditions are satisfied, a cartel conducted abroad is
within the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act.
In 1982, the U.S. Congress expressed more clearly its intention to
cover certain acts conducted abroad by passing the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act (“FTAIA”), which incorporates the effects test
proposed by Judge Hand.199 The FTAIA provides that conduct involving
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 440.
Id. at 443.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 444.
Id.
Id.
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6A (2012).
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trade with foreign nations to which the Sherman Act applies must have a
direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on trade or commerce
in the United States.200 In Kruman v. Christie’s International, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeal, referring to the phrase “direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect” in the FTAIA, said that “this limit will
likely prevent conduct that merely has an ancillary effect on our markets
from being actionable under our antitrust laws.”201
However, the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Sherman Act provided
for under the FTAIA is broader than the approach suggested by Judge
Hand in Alcoa because the FTAIA does not take into account the intent to
affect trade, but rather focuses only on the effects. The FTAIA allows the
Sherman Act to cover conduct that has a direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect on trade or commerce.202 The Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) explain subsection
6A of the FTAIA in the Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International
Operations203:
[The DOJ and FTC] apply the “direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable” standard of the FTAIA . . . in cases in which a cartel
of foreign enterprises, or a foreign monopolist, reaches the U.S.
market through any mechanism that goes beyond direct sales, such
as the use of an unrelated intermediary, as well as in cases in which
foreign vertical restrictions or intellectual property licensing
arrangements have an anticompetitive effect on U.S. commerce.204
Hartford Fire Insurance was an antitrust case in which the Supreme
Court applied the Sherman Act to conduct that took place completely
abroad after considering Judge Hand’s test from Alcoa.205 This case
involved a number of U.S. and London-based companies.206 The plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants, a group of London reinsurers and brokers,
colluded to coerce primary insurers in the U.S. to offer commercial general
liability coverage only on a claims-made basis.207 A different group of
London reinsurers were charged with another conspiracy to withhold
Id.
Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC., 284 F.3d 384, 402 (2002).
15 U.S.C. § 6A.
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1995).
204. Id. § 3.12.
205. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
206. Id. at 764.
207. Id.
200.
201.
202.
203.
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reinsurance for pollution coverage.208 The defendants asserted that
“applying the [Sherman] Act to their conduct would conflict significantly
with British law.”209
Justice Souter, delivering the opinion of the Court, found that U.S.
antitrust law can be applied to conduct that is deemed legal in the state
where it took place.210 Justice Souter cited the lower court’s decision in
Alcoa, saying that “it is well established by now that the Sherman Act
applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact
produce some substantial effect in the United States.”211 He observed that
the alleged conduct of the foreign defendants was intended to, and did in
fact, have a substantial effect on the U.S. insurance market,212 satisfying
the two elements of Judge Hand’s effects test from Alcoa. The Court
further held that “[e]ven assuming that a court may decline to exercise
Sherman Act jurisdiction over foreign conduct in an appropriate case,
international comity would not counsel against exercising jurisdiction in
the circumstances alleged here.”213
The most recent case testing the extraterritorial application of the
Sherman Act is Motorola Mobility v. AU Optronics, in which the court
considered the language from the FTAIA.214 Motorola, a company that
manufactured and sold cellular telephones, and its foreign subsidiaries
bought liquid-crystal display (LCD) panels and incorporated them into cell
phones manufactured by the parent and its subsidiaries.215 Motorola
alleged that several foreign manufacturers of the panels violated the
Sherman Act by engaging in price-fixing.216 Judge Posner analyzed the
effects of the defendants’ alleged cartel on the U.S. and observed that
[o]nly about 1 percent of the panels were bought by, and delivered
to, Motorola in the United States; the other 99 percent were bought
by, paid for, and delivered to its foreign subsidiaries . . . . Fortytwo percent of all the panels were bought by the subsidiaries and
incorporated by them into products that were then shipped to
Motorola in the United States for resale by Motorola (which did
none of the manufacturing). Another 57 percent of the panels were
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 776.
Id. at 798.
Id. at 799.
Id. at 796.
Id.
Id. at 765.
746 F.3d 842 (2014).
Id. at 843.
Id. at 843.
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also bought by the subsidiaries, but were incorporated into
products that were sold abroad as well . . . .217
Judge Posner then asserted that the court should ignore 57% of the
panels from Motorola’s claim because any claim involving those panels
was clearly barred by the FTAIA because the panels were sold abroad.218
Although the district court had ruled that Motorola’s claim regarding 42%
of the panels was barred by the FTAIA,219 the Seventh Circuit required
that Motorola “show that the defendants’ price fixing of [these] panels that
they sold abroad and that became components of cellphones imported by
Motorola had ‘a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect’ on
commerce within the United States.”220 Judge Posner then contended:
The alleged price fixers are not selling the panels in the United
States. They are selling them abroad to foreign companies (the
Motorola subsidiaries) that incorporate them into products that are
then exported to the United States for resale by the parent. The
effect of component price fixing on the price of the product of
which it is a component is indirect . . . .221
The Seventh Circuit continued, stating that “[t]he effect of the alleged
price fixing on that commerce in this case is mediated by Motorola’s
decision on what price to charge U.S. consumers for the cellphones
manufactured abroad that are alleged to have contained a price-fixed
component.”222 Judge Posner asserted that if the defendants were
overcharging, they were overcharging other foreign manufacturers.223 He
also cited the U.S Supreme Court’s warning “that rampant extraterritorial
application of U.S. law ‘creates a serious risk of interference with a foreign
nation’s ability independently to regulate its own commercial affairs.’”224
The Seventh Circuit then upheld the district court’s ruling holding that

217. Id.
218. Id. at 844.
219. Motorola Mobility, Inc. v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 09-C-6610, 2014
WL 258154, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2014), vacated 746 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 2014),
on rehearing 773 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2014), aff’d 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2015),
cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 2837 (2017).
220. Motorola, 746 F.3d at 844.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 845.
223. Id. at 846.
224. Id. (citing F. Hoffman La-Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 524 U.S. 155,
164 (2004)).
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[t]he FTAIA applies to Motorola’s foreign injury claims because
they are based on nonimport conduct involving trade with foreign
nations. These claims do not fall under the FTAIA’s domestic
injury exception because they do not arise from any domestic
effect. . . . Motorola’s claims based on overseas purchases by its
foreign affiliates (the Category II and III claims) are dismissed.225
The interpretations of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Sherman
Act by U.S. courts are difficult to reconcile, as the decision of the Second
Circuit in Alcoa is contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in American
Banana. Moreover, the two-condition effects test, introduced in Alcoa, is
supported by other courts, including the Supreme Court in Hartford Fire
Insurance, and reflected in the FTAIA.226 This indicates that Congress and
the judiciary do not intend to confine the application of the Sherman Act
to the territory of the U.S. However, this support does not mean that the
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Sherman Act is unlimited.
In addition to considering the intent and substantial effects of the alleged
conduct on U.S. trade, the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the
Sherman Act also considers international comity and the sovereign
immunity of foreign countries.
3. Consideration of Foreign Country Interests and International
Comity
Although court decisions on the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the
Sherman Act have differed over time, the decisions have not undermined
foreign sovereign interests or the international law principle of
international comity. In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, Judge
Choy delivered the opinion for the Ninth Circuit, stating that “[t]he effects
test by itself is incomplete because it fails to consider other nations’
interests.”227 He then introduced a three-part analysis. First, a court must
consider the actual or intended effect on U.S. foreign commerce.228
Second, a court must consider whether the effect is sufficiently significant
to present a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs and therefore a civil
225. Motorola Mobility, Inc. v. AU Optronics Corp., No. 09-C-6610, 2014
WL 258154, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2014), vacated 746 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 2014),
on rehearing 773 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2014), aff’d 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2015),
cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 2837 (2017).
226. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6A (2012).
227. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 611–12 (9th
Cir. 1976).
228. Id. at 613.
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violation of the antitrust laws.229 Third, a court must consider whether the
interests of the U.S., including the magnitude of the effect on U.S. foreign
commerce, are sufficiently strong, vis-a-vis those of other nations, to
justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority.230 This analysis is called a
“balancing of interests” approach.231 Besides considering the effects of the
alleged act on U.S. foreign trade, as Judge Hand proposed in Alcoa, this
approach also considers the interests of other countries in comparison with
those of the U.S. in determining the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the
Sherman Act.
The American Law Institute’s 1987 Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States reflects the consideration of foreign
interests in the extraterritorial effect of laws as well. Section 403 provides
that a state may not enact laws that have an unreasonable extraterritorial
effect on persons or activities.232 The “unreasonableness” may relate the
extent to which another state might have an interest in regulating the
activity and the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.233
The Restatement also provides that
[w]hen it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to
exercise jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions
by the two states are in conflict, each state has an obligation to
evaluate its own as well as the other state’s interest in exercising
jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors. . . . [A] state should
defer to the other state if that state’s interest is clearly greater.234
Although the 1987 Restatement provides helpful guidance, this
restatement is a secondary source of law, and it reflects the opinions of the
American Law Institute, a private organization not affiliated with the U.S.
government or any of its agencies.235 Specifically, the 1987 Restatement
reflects the opinions of the American Law Institute in international law as
it applies to the U.S. and domestic law impacting foreign relations.236
Nevertheless, although it is “in no sense an official document of the United
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. M. Sornarajah, The Extraterritorial Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Laws:
Conflict and Compromise, 31 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 127, 147 (1982).
232. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(1) (AM. LAW
INST. 1987).
233. Id. § 403(2).
234. Id. §403(3).
235. Id. at Foreword.
236. Id.
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States,”237 the 1987 Restatement has been cited by U.S. courts in a number
of cases.238
In F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S. A. in 2004, the U.S.
Supreme Court rejected the application of the Sherman Act under the
FTAIA’s exception because the Court ordinarily construes ambiguous
statutes in a way that avoids unreasonable interference with other nations’
sovereign authority.239 In this case, the defendants had entered into a cartel
in a foreign territory and caused damage to the plaintiff outside U.S.
territory.240 The Court said that “Congress would not have intended the
FTAIA’s exception to bring independently caused foreign injury within
the Sherman Act's reach.”241 Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas concurred
in the judgment, asserting that “statutes should be read in accord with the
customary deference to the application of foreign countries’ laws within
their own territories.”242 Thus, the consideration of foreign country
interests and international comity is a factor on which U.S. courts rely to
limit the EACL.
4. Consideration of the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine
When an act occurs in one country and has an effect on another
country, a possibility exists that the party acted under the compulsion of
the former country’s law or under the direction of that country’s authority.
These acts should be distinguished from purely private conduct.
Accordingly, U.S. courts have recognized sovereign immunity when
determining jurisdiction over these acts, cognizant of the fact that claiming
jurisdiction over such acts requires passing judgment on the sovereign acts
of other states. This awareness is consistent with the doctrine of state
immunity under customary international law and with the U.N.
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property
(“Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities”).243 In general, this doctrine
237. Id.
238. See Moritimer Off Shore Serv., Ltd. v. Fed. Republic of Germ., 615 F.3d
97, 109 (2010); F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164
(2004); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
239. F. Hoffman-La Roche, 542 U.S. at 164.
240. Id. at 159.
241. Id. at 173.
242. Id. at 176.
243. AUST, supra note 22, at 159–78; see also G.A. Res. 59/38, United Nations
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, (Dec. 2,
2004).
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prevents courts from exercising jurisdiction over another state.244 Such
disputes over jurisdiction can be disposed of only by the courts of the
foreign state itself, by an international court or tribunal, or by diplomatic
settlement.245
Sovereign immunity was first recognized in the U.S. in 1812 in the
U.S. Supreme Court case The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.246 Justice
Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court, asserting that “[i]t seems then
to the Court, to be a principle of public law, that national ships of war,
entering the port of a friendly power open for their reception, are to be
considered as exempted by the consent of that power from its
jurisdiction.”247 Similarly in Underhill v. Hernandez in 1897, Justice
Fuller of the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Second
Circuit. Justice Fuller explained that “the acts of the defendant were the
acts of the government of Venezuela, and as such are not properly the
subject of adjudication in the courts of another government.”248 Both
courts agreed that “[e]very sovereign State is bound to respect the
independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory.”249
In antitrust law, because the Sherman Act’s prohibitions apply only to
a “person” or a “corporation,” courts in the U.S. have asserted that the
Act’s jurisdiction does not extend to the conduct of another state.250
According to the District Court of Delaware in InterAmerican Refining
Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo in 1970, “[t]he Sherman Act does not confer
jurisdiction on United States courts over acts of foreign sovereigns. By its
terms, it forbids only anticompetitive practices of persons and
corporations.”251 The District Court for the Central District of California
agreed with this point in International Association of Machinists v.
OPEC.252

244. G.A. Res. 59/38, supra note 243, annex, art. 5.
245. AUST, supra note 22, at 159.
246. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Org’n of Petroleum Exp. Countries, 477 F.
Supp. 553, 565 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
247. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 14546 (1812).
248. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
249. Id.
250. Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291,
1298 (D. Del. 1970).
251. Id.
252. Intern. Ass’n of Machinists v. Org’n of Petroleum Exp. Countries, 477 F.
Supp. 533, 571 (C.D. Cal. 1979).

462

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

However, a state may not enjoy sovereign immunity when the alleged
act is commercial in nature. Article 10 of the Convention on Jurisdictional
Immunities provides a limit on invoking immunity if a state “engages in a
commercial transaction with a foreign natural or juridical person” and
“differences relating to the commercial transaction fall within the
jurisdiction . . . of another State.”253 The same limit to sovereign immunity
is provided for in the U.S. in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 (“FSIA”). According to section 1605, a foreign state shall not be
immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. or state courts when the “action is
based [on] commercial activity carried on in the United States by [a]
foreign state”; an action performed in the United States is connected to “a
commercial activity of [a] foreign state elsewhere”; or an action outside
the territory of the United States is connected to “a commercial activity of
the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United
States.”254
According to the FSIA, the “foreign state” includes corporations that
are agents or instrumentalities of a foreign state.255 Therefore, the action
of a company under the direction or compulsion of a foreign state is
regarded as that of the foreign state. Section 1603(d) defines “commercial
activity” as “either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular
commercial transaction or act,” and adds that “[t]he commercial character
of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course
of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its
purpose.”256 Commercial contracts or transactions will, therefore,
generally be regarded as commercial activities and will not be protected
by sovereign immunity. In Machinists,257 the court found that, using
legislative intent, “commercial activity” includes activity within “‘a
regular course of commercial conduct’ . . . the carrying on of a commercial
enterprise such as a mineral extraction company, an airline, or a state
trading corporation.”258 There is a difference between the Convention on
Jurisdictional Immunity and the FSIA, however. Article 2 of the
Convention indicates that the law takes into account the purpose of a
commercial transaction, while section 1603(d) of FSIA does not.259
253. G.A. Res. 59/38, supra note 243.
254. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2012).
255. Id. § 1603.
256. Id. § 1603(d).
257. Machinists, 477 F. Supp. at 568.
258. Id. at n.14.
259. G.A. Res. 59/38, supra note 243, at annex, art. 2 (“In determining whether
a contract or transaction is a ‘commercial transaction’ . . . reference should be
made primarily to the nature of the contract or transaction, but its purpose should
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Despite the fact that section 1603(d) of the FSIA suggests that
“commercial activity” is much broader than the “commercial transaction”
as used in the Convention of Jurisdictional Immunity, U.S. courts have
found that “commercial activity” should be defined narrowly.260 In
Machinists, the plaintiff commenced an action in the District Court for the
Central District of California against the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (“OPEC”) and its 13 member nations.261 The plaintiff
alleged that the defendants’ price-fixing activities violated the Sherman
Act.262 Additionally, the plaintiff claimed that the court’s jurisdiction was
based on the FSIA.263 The 13 OPEC member nations chose not to make an
appearance in the action.264
Judge Hauk observed that under the theory of absolute sovereign
immunity, a foreign state could not be sued without its consent.265 But
under the restrictive theory, foreign states and sovereignties are not
immune insofar as their commercial activities are concerned.266 In
determining whether the activities of the OPEC members were
governmental or commercial in nature, Judge Hauk examined both the
FSIA and the standards recognized under international law and concluded
that “the defendants’ control over their oil resources is an especially
sovereign function because oil, as their primary, if not sole, revenueproducing resource, is crucial to the welfare of their nations’ peoples.”267
Judge Hauk also considered the views of the state of California and the
federal government concerning domestic crude oil activities and
concluded that “there can be little question that establishing the terms and
conditions for removal of natural resources from its territory, when done
by a sovereign state, individually and separately, is a governmental
activity.”268 The Central District Court of California then held that the

also be taken into account if the parties to the contract or transaction have so
agreed, or if, in the practice of the State of the forum, that purpose is relevant to
determining the non-commercial character of the contract or transaction.”).
260. Machinists, 477 F. Supp. at 567.
261. Id. at 558.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 559.
264. Id. at 560.
265. Id. at 565.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 568.
268. Id.
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defendants’ activity was immune to the FSIA because it was not
“commercial activity.”269 The court, therefore, lacked jurisdiction.270
Limiting the protection of sovereign immunity to non-commercial
activity might, however, result in some improper decisions. For example,
a state may order producers in an industry to fix a minimum price for a
product for the purpose of protecting employee rights. The export of the
product to the U.S. could be considered a commercial activity. However,
the producers have no way to resist the order of their home country’s
authority—their behaviors are under the compulsion of a sovereign. The
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction of U.S. antitrust law against the
price-fixing cartel in such a case would, therefore, be improper.
5. Exercise of Foreign Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the U.S.
Unlike Canada, U.S. laws do not provide strict opposition to the
exercise of foreign extraterritorial jurisdiction in the U.S. There is no
statute that prevents the enforcement of foreign judgments or directions in
the U.S., and there is no law, such as the Canadian Foreign Extraterritorial
Measures Act, allowing a defendant to recover damages or penalties paid
under a foreign court’s judgment.271 Rather, 28 U.S.C. § 1782 allows U.S.
district courts to assist foreign and international tribunals, and litigants
before such tribunals. Section 1782 provides that a district court may order
its resident “to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document
or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international
tribunal.”272 Section 1782 also states that a person in the U.S. is not
prohibited from cooperating with foreign authority when such authority
may exercise foreign jurisdiction in the U.S.273 Thus U.S. law does not
preclude persons within the U.S. from voluntarily giving their testimony
or producing a document to a foreign or international tribunal.274 However,
the foreign authority in this section is limited to foreign countries with
which the U.S. is at peace.275
In sum, the U.S. exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction in the area of
antitrust law. The exercise of that jurisdiction includes both prescriptive
and adjudicative jurisdiction. U.S. courts apply the effects doctrine to
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction. The extraterritorial application of
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. at 569.
Id.
Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C. 1985, c F-29, § 9(1) (Can.).
28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2012).
Id. § 1782(b).
Id.
Id. § 1782, Historical and Revision Notes, Amendments (1964).
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antitrust law, however, is neither unlimited nor at the discretion of the
courts. Federal statutes and court decisions have set out restrictions on the
application of antitrust law to conduct in foreign territories. Namely, the
alleged act must have a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect on U.S. trade or commerce; the alleged person must have intended
to affect U.S. trade or commerce; and the magnitude of the effect on U.S.
foreign commerce must be sufficient relative to the effect on other
nations.276 This limit also considers whether the alleged act is governed or
remedied by foreign law. Finally, courts have refrained from exercising
extraterritorial jurisdiction when the alleged act was conducted under the
direction or compulsion of a foreign sovereign.
C. The Japanese Approach
Japan is a civil law jurisdiction in which laws arise primarily from
statutes rather than judicial decisions.277 According to the Court Act of
Japan, “[a] conclusion in a judgment of a higher instance court shall bind
the lower instance courts with respect to the case concerned.”278 Therefore,
the judgment of a higher court in a particular case is binding on lower
courts, but is not binding in general.
Japan’s main competition law, the Antimonopoly Act of Japan
(“AMA”),279 does not state the scope of its extraterritorial jurisdiction.
However, the extraterritorial application of the AMA has been discussed
by the Japan Fair Trade Commission (“JFTC”). These decisions of the
JFTC were previously treated as equivalent to judgments of the district
court.280

276. See discussion supra Part II.B.2, 3.
277. HIROSHI ITOH & LAWRENCE W. BEER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW
OF JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, 1961–70, at 8 (1978).
278. Saibansho hō [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 4 (Japanese Law
Translation [JLT DS]), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp [https://perma
.cc/2GWJ-C2FZ] (Japan).
279. Shitekidokusen no Kinshi oyobi Kouseitorihiki no Kakuho nikansuru
Houritsu, [Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair
Trade] [Antimonopoly Act], Law No. 54 of 1947, (Japanese Law Translation
[JLT DS]), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp [https://perma.cc/2GWJC2FZ] (Japan).
280. According to Article 85 of the 2005 amendment of the AMA, decisions
of the JFTC were subject to the judicial review of the Tokyo High Court. Since
the 2013 amendment of the AMA went into effect, decisions of the JFTC are
reviewed by the Tokyo District Court. See id. at arts. 85, 85-2.
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The AMA was enacted in 1947, and the latest amendment was passed
in 2013.281 The AMA has no provision that expressly states that the act
covers conduct that takes place in a foreign territory, but jurisdiction over
such conduct may be inferred from certain provisions. Article 2 defines
private monopolization, unreasonable restraint of trade, and monopolistic
situation as activities of an “enterprise.”282 Similarly, article 9 states that
“[n]o company may be established that would cause an excessive
concentration of economic power due to share holding . . . in other
companies in Japan.”283 The words “enterprise” and “company” may be
understood to limit the jurisdiction of the AMA to Japanese territory.
However, these terms may be interpreted more broadly, which suggests
that regardless of an enterprise’s or company’s nationality, the AMA
governs its conduct as long as its activities have effects in Japan.
In practice, the JFTC tends to interpret the words “enterprise” and
“company” broadly. In MDS Nordion Inc. in 1998, the JFTC applied the
AMA to a foreign company’s act that occurred mostly outside Japan.284
MDS Nordion, a Canadian firm, was the largest manufacturer of
Molybdenum-99 in the world and possessed a 100% share of the
Molybdenum-99 market in Japan.285 MDS Nordion allegedly prevented its
competitors from entering the Japanese market by entering into exclusive
contracts, effective for ten years, with the two companies that were the
sole purchasers of Molybdenum-99 in Japan.286 The JFTC observed that
the word “‘firm’ is defined in the AMA as ‘a person who carries on a
commercial, industrial, financial or any other business.’”287 It held that this
definition did not exclude foreign firms.288 Therefore, although MDS
Nordion was a Canadian firm that did not have an office in Japan, it was
included in the definition of “firm” because it had entered into long-term
281. Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Comm’n, The Enactment of the Bill to
Amend the Antimonopoly Act (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/press
releases/yearly-2013/Dec/individual131209.html [https://perma.cc/46SY-G6RR].
282. Antimonopoly Act art. 2.
283. Id. at art. 9.
284. Kōsei Torihiki Iinkai [Japan Fair Trade Comm’n] Sept. 3, 1998, no. 16,
KŌTORII DS, http://snk.jftc.go.jp/JDS/data/pdf/H100903H10J02000016_/H100903
H10J02000016_.pdf [https://perma.cc/PX9J-FLFA] (Japan).
285. Hiroo Iwanari, Remedies, Sanctions and Judicial Review in Japan: A Brief
Overview of the Antimonopoly Act Procedures (Nov. 25–27, 2004) (unpublished
workshop paper), www.jftc.go.jp/eacpf/03/iwanari_unctad200411.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/7V3R-A79A].
286. Id.
287. Id. at 5.
288. Id.
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contracts with two Japanese companies and continuously shipped products
to Japan.289 The JFTC ultimately held that MDS Nordion’s conduct was
illegal under the AMA.290
In Marine Hose in 2008, the JFTC applied the AMA to an
international cartel, conducted abroad by foreign companies, which had
anticompetitive effects in Japan.291 In this case, the JFTC launched an
investigation in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Justice and the
European Commission.292 These entities investigated one Japanese
company, one British company, one French company, and two Italian
companies.293 These companies had agreed to allocate consumers in the
international market of specified Marine Hose between them.294 The JFTC
issued a cease-and-desist order against the companies participating in the
cartel, including those foreign companies located abroad.295 The
companies subject to the cease-and-desist order were required to confirm
that the illegal trade practices had terminated, and each company was
required to conduct independent business operations that were free of
illegal practices.296 Although the foreign companies were not imposed
with any administrative fine, their practices were found to be illegal and
they were subject to the cease-and-desist order.297 This case indicates that
the JFTC will exercise jurisdiction over companies located abroad when
the companies enter into a cartel and harm the Japanese market.

289. Shogo Itoda, Competition Policy of Japan and its Global Implementation,
in COMPETITION POLICY IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 61, 63 (Clifford A.
Jones & Mitsuo Matsushita eds., 2002).
290. Kōsei Torihiki Iinkai [Japan Fair Trade Comm’n] Sept. 3, 1998, no. 16,
KŌTORII DS, http://snk.jftc.go.jp/JDS/data/pdf/H100903H10J02000016_/H100903
H10J02000016_.pdf [https://perma.cc/PX9J-FLFA] (Japan).
291. Kōsei Torihiki Iinkai [Japan Fair Trade Comm’n] Feb. 20, 2008, no. 2,
KŌTORII DS, http://snk.jftc.go.jp/JDS/data/pdf/H200220H20J11000002_/%EF%B
C%92%EF%BC%90%EF%BC%8D%EF%BC%92.pdf [https://perma.cc/38C8D2LE] (Japan).
292. Cease and Desist Order and Surcharge Payment Order against Marine
Hose Manufacturers, JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMMISSION (Feb. 22, 2008), http://www
.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2008/feb/individual_000147.html [https://perma
.cc/PV2X-EXEX].
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
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Cathode Ray Tubes for Television is the latest case in which the JFTC
has applied the AMA extraterritorially.298 In 2009, the JFTC issued a
cease-and-desist order and a surcharge payment order against an
international cartel that fixed the price of Cathode Ray Tubes (“CRTs”)
imported into Japan.299 Japanese CRT television manufacturers required
their overseas manufacturing subsidiaries to enter into an agreement that
set minimum target prices for specified CRTs.300 Although the
manufacturers and their subsidiaries did not sell CRTs directly to
customers in Japan, CRT television sets, which included a CRT, were sold
to customers in Japan.301 The JFTC concluded that although the agreement
was entered into outside of Japan, the AMA could be applied because
competition inside Japan was substantially restrained.302
Although the JFTC seemingly adopted an effects doctrine in applying
the AMA to anticompetitive conduct engaged in outside Japan, the JFTC
indicated no clear limit on the exercise of this jurisdiction. In MDS
Nordion Inc. and Marine Hose, the violation had a direct and substantial
restraint on competition in Japan because the violators were selling
directly to consumers in Japan. In contrast, in CRT, the effect on
competition in Japan was indirect.
The MDS Nordion Inc., Marine Hose, and Cathode Ray Tubes cases
illustrate that the JFTC is willing to apply the AMA to anticompetitive
conduct that occurs in foreign territory but has effects in Japan. The
absence of any Japanese statutes or higher court judgments opposing such
an extraterritorial application of the AMA by the JFTC suggests that the
Congress of Japan intended the AMA to be applied extraterritorially.
In contrast to its willingness to apply the AMA to anticompetitive
conduct abroad, the Japanese government does not recognize the exercise
298. Kōsei Torihiki Iinkai [Japan Fair Trade Comm’n] May 22, 2015, no. 7,
KŌTORII DS, http://snk.jftc.go.jp/JDS/data/pdf/H270522H22J01000007_/15052222_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3T9-HYNR] (Japan).
299. Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Comm’n, Cease-and-Desist Order and
Surcharge Payment Orders against Manufacturers of Cathode Ray Tubes for
Televisions (Oct. 7, 2009), http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2009/oct/
individual-000037.html [https://perma.cc/YGJ8-AHZZ].
300. Id.
301. RYUNOSUKE USHIJIMA, PRICE-FIXING CONSPIRACY ON CATHODE RAY
TUBES (“CRT”) FOR TELEVISION SETS, http://www.antitrustasia.com/sites/default
/files/PriceFixingConspiracyonCRT.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZ5D-3UTF] (last visited
Sept. 10, 2016).
302. Takanori Abe & Kaoru Ochiai, Japan: The JFTC Applies Antimonopoly
Act Beyond Borders for the First Time, MANAGING INTELL. PROP. (Oct. 28, 2015),
http://www.managingip.com/Article/3501783/Japan-JFTC-applies-AntimonopolyAct-beyond-borders-for-first-time.html [https://perma.cc/TJ2S-ZHBK].
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of foreign competition law in Japan. On November 18, 1996, in United
States of America v. Nippon Paper Industries Co., the government of
Japan filed a brief in the U.S. Court of Appeal for the First Circuit in which
it asserted that, following principles of international law, “anticompetitive
activities occurring within Japanese territory by Japanese corporations fall
primarily under the scope of Japanese jurisdiction and are regulated by
Japanese legislation.”303 The Japanese government continued and stated
that the application of U.S. antitrust law to such activities would be invalid
“in the absence of a substantial link between the activities and the source
of jurisdiction.”304 The Japanese government also wrote that “[o]ne
Nation’s unilateral adjudication or extraterritorial application of its
national laws is not, however, an appropriate means of resolving
international differences.”305 The government of Japan then urged the
court to hold that U.S. courts should not exercise jurisdiction over business
activities conducted in Japan by Japanese companies.306
The government of Japan made the same argument in 2004 in F.
Hoffman-La Roche v. Empagran S.A.307 In that case, the Japanese
government submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of petitioners to
the Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia Circuit.308 The
government argued that the FTAIA sought to clarify the limits of U.S.
antitrust jurisdiction in U.S. foreign commerce, not expand that
jurisdiction.309 The brief cited the statement of U.S. Congress that “[t]he
clarified reach of our own laws could encourage our trading partners to
take more effective steps to protect competition in their markets under
their competition laws.”310 The government of Japan asserted that nothing
in the FTAIA’s legislative history suggests that it was intended to expand
U.S. antitrust jurisdiction to foreign firms in foreign markets and if the

303. Brief for Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 1–2, United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. 1997) (No. 96-2001), 1996 U.S. 1st Cir. Briefs LEXIS 11 at *1.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 2.
306. Id. at 8.
307. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
308. Brief for Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners
at 4, F. Hoffman-La Roche v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724),
2004 WL 226390.
309. Id. at *4.
310. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 14 (1982), as reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2499).
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legislature had intended such an expansion, “there would have been a
storm of criticism by foreign governments.”311
In sum, Japan’s approach to the extraterritorial application of
competition law is inconsistent. The JFTC has applied the AMA
extraterritorially, apparently based on an effects doctrine, but it fails to
provide a clear limit on the AMA’s extraterritorial jurisdiction. The
Japanese government, however, strongly opposes the extraterritorial
application of foreign competition law to transactions conducted by
Japanese corporations in Japan. These conflicting views indicate that Japan
has a double standard when it comes to the EACL. Japan should provide a
clearer analytical basis for determining the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the
AMA, and one that consistently reflects the opinion of Japan toward the
application of foreign jurisdiction competition law in Japan.
D. The Vietnamese Approach
In Vietnam, the National Assembly creates the law and only the
Standing Committee of the National Assembly has the power to interpret
the law when it is unclear.312 The Judge Council of the People’s Supreme
Court has the power to provide guidelines unifying the application of law to
adjudication.313 Therefore, the extraterritorial jurisdiction of competition
law should be found in the Competition Law of Vietnam enacted by the
National Assembly or in the interpretation of that law by the Standing
Committee, and not in the decisions of the People’s Supreme Court.
Article 2 of the Competition Law of Vietnam expressly states that this
law shall apply to “[b]usiness organizations and individuals (hereinafter
referred collectively to as enterprises), including also enterprises producing,
supplying products, providing public-utility services, enterprises operating
in the State-monopolized sectors and domains, and foreign enterprises
operating in Vietnam.”314 However, the law does not define the word
“operating” and the Standing Committee has not yet interpreted this term.
There are two different ideas among the legal community on the
meaning of “foreign enterprises operating in Vietnam” that are subject to

311. Id.
312. Luật Ban Hành Văn Bản Quy Phạm Pháp Luật [Law on Promulgation of
Legislative Documents], No. 80/2015/QH13 of June 22, 2015, art. 3, para. 3
(Viet.).
313. Id. art. 21.
314. Luật Cạnh Tranh [Competition Law], No. 27/2004/QH11 of Dec. 3, 2004,
art. 2 (Viet.).

2016]

EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF COMPETITION LAW 471

the Competition Law.315 The first is that the Competition Law can only
govern acts conducted by foreign enterprises when two conditions are
satisfied: first, the alleged act has taken place, or is taking place, in
Vietnam; and second, the foreign enterprise must register its business in
Vietnam as a foreign direct invested company, branch, or representative
office.316 This opinion suggests that it is impossible for Vietnamese
authorities to conduct an investigation or enforce a final judgement in a
foreign territory. Moreover, the exercise of Vietnamese jurisdiction over
acts conducted by a foreign enterprise abroad would violate international
comity.
Proponents of this first opinion argue that the Competition Law of
Vietnam should state the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Competition
Law more clearly, if law makers intended that the law have extraterritorial
effects.317 This request for express language is supported by the express
language in the Penal Code of Vietnam, enacted five years before the
Competition Law. Article 6(2) of the Penal Code provides clearly that
“[f]oreigners who commit offenses outside the territory of the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam may be examined for penal liability according to the
Penal Code of Vietnam in circumstances provided for in the international
treaties, which the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has signed or acceded
to.”318
The second opinion on the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the
Competition Law of Vietnam is that the law should cover conduct by
foreign enterprises abroad as long as such acts has effects on Vietnam. 319
Proponents of this opinion argue that the term “operating” is broad.320 It
covers a wide range of activities, including commercial purposes.
According to article 3(1) of the Commercial Law of Vietnam,
“commercial activity” means “[an] activity for profit-making purposes,
comprising purchase and sale of goods, provision of services, investment,
commercial enhancement, and other activities for profit-making

315. PHAN CONG THANH, VIET. COMPETITION AUTH., ERIA-DP-2015-86,
COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT OF VIET NAM AND THE NECESSITY OF A
TRANSPARENT REGIONAL COMPETITION POLICY 23–25 (2015), http://www.eria.org
/publications/discussion_papers/DP2015-86.html [https://perma.cc/9VZQ-SWGM].
316. Id. at 23.
317. Id. at 24.
318. Bộ Luật Hình Sự [Penal Code], No. 15/1999/QH10 of Dec. 21, 1999, art.
6, para. 2 (Viet.).
319. THANH, supra note 315, at 24.
320. Id.
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purposes.”321 Therefore, any foreign firm doing any profit-making activity
would be covered by the Competition Law, regardless of its registration in the
territory where it is located. Article 3(3) of the Competition Law also defines
“practices in restraint of competition” as “acts performed by enterprises to
reduce, distort and prevent competition on the market, including agreements
to restrict competition, abuse of a dominant position in the market, abuse of
the monopoly position and economic concentration.”322 This definition does
not limit acts restraining competition to acts engaged in within the territorial
limits of Vietnam.
These two opinions on extraterritorial jurisdiction are in conflict.
Business registration in Vietnam is not necessary to determine the
jurisdiction of the Competition Law because, on the one hand, according to
article 4(9) of Law on Enterprise of Vietnam, a Vietnamese company is “any
enterprise that is established or registered under Vietnam’s law and has its
headquarter located in Vietnam.”323 A foreign direct-invested company in
Vietnam, consequently, is a Vietnamese enterprise, not a foreign
company. On the other hand, according to article 16 of the Commercial
Law of Vietnam, “[f]oreign business entities shall be liable before the law
of Vietnam for all operations of their representative offices and branches
in Vietnam.”324 The conduct of a branch or a representative office of a
foreign company is that of the foreign company and is, therefore, still
regarded as conduct taken place in a foreign territory. The second opinion,
therefore, contends that the phrase “operating in Vietnam” refers to the
link between the alleged conduct of a foreign enterprise that takes place
abroad and its effects on Vietnam. This opinion reflects the effects
doctrine found in other jurisdictions.
In the early days of the Vietnamese Competition Authority, there was
a widely-shared view that the Competition Law of 2004 did not apply to
conduct abroad.325 After nine years of growth, the VCA has become more
capable of handling complicated cases, including offshore mergers.326 As

321. Luật Thương Mại [Commercial Law], No. 36/2005/QH11 of June 14,
2005, art. 3, para. 1 (Viet.).
322. Luật Cạnh Tranh [Competition Law], No. 27/2004/QH11 of Dec. 3, 2004,
art. 3, para 3 (Viet.).
323. Luật Doanh Nghiệp [Law on Enterprises], No. 68/2014/QH13 of Nov. 26,
2014, art. 4, para. 9 (Viet.) (emphasis omitted).
324. Luật Thương Mại [Commercial Law], No. 36/2005/QH11 of June 14,
2005, art. 16 para. 3 (Viet.).
325. THANH, supra note 315, at 25.
326. VIET. COMPETITION AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT 2010, (2011) [hereinafter
ANNUAL REPORT]; VIET. COMPETITION AUTH., REPORT ON ECONOMIC
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a result, the second opinion has become the most prevalent. The first case
involving the extraterritorial application of the Competition Law of
Vietnam was the Prudential and AIA Group Limited (“AIA”) acquisition
case.327 In April 2010, the VCA received an application for consultation
made by Prudential, based in the United Kingdom, and the American
International Group Inc. (“AIG”), based in the U.S., concerning
Prudential’s acquisition of AIA, a subsidiary of AIG.328 At the time of
application, Prudential and AIA had subsidiaries in Vietnam.329 The
combined market share of the subsidiaries in the life insurance market in
Vietnam was 47%.330 The merger was not conducted in Vietnam and the
participants were not Vietnamese companies.331 The merger would,
however, substantially affect the Vietnamese life insurance market
because the affiliates of the merging parties had a large market share in
Vietnam.332 Despite the fact that the merger and merger participants were
located abroad, Prudential and AIG worked with the VCA on the
submission of their merger notification.333 The case was closed in June
2010 because the participants chose not to proceed with the merger.334
The second case involving the extraterritorial application of the
Competition Law of Vietnam is the P3 case in 2014.335 P3 was an alliance
of three large shipping companies, Maersk Line, Mediterranean Shipping
Company, and CMA CGM—the head offices of each located outside of
Vietnam.336 The participating companies sought to create a joint venture,

CONCENTRATION IN VIETNAM 2014, (2015) [hereinafter REPORT ON ECONOMIC
CONCENTRATION].
327. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 326, at 27.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Press Release, Prudential Plc, Termination of Agreement to Combine with
AIA Group Ltd. (June 3, 2010), http://www.prudential.co.uk/~/media/Files
/P/Prudential-Corp/aia-archive/termination-agreem-aia.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CW
M-P2XR].
335. See REPORT ON ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION, supra note 326, at 53.
336. For information about Maersk see About Us, MAERSK GROUP
http://www.maersk.com/en/the-maersk-group/about-us [https://perma.cc/L4PAWJPQ] (last visited Oct. 3, 2016). For information about CMA CGM see About
Us, CMA CGM, https://www.cma-cgm.com/the-group/about-us/presentation
[https://perma.cc/8AXD-SVFV] (last visited Oct. 3, 2016). For information about
Mediterranean Shipping Company see Contact Us, MEDITERRANEAN SHIPPING
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which would have operated the P3 Network.337 The participating firms
submitted a merger notification to the VCA pursuant to article 20 of the
Competition Law of Vietnam, as the operation of the proposed network
would affect the Vietnamese container shipping market.338 This case was
closed and the proposed network was abandoned when China’s Ministry
of Commerce, a competition authority, refused to approve the merger.339
Besides these two primary cases, there have been some offshore
merger cases where the participating parties have consulted the VCA
before concluding the mergers.340 These cases came to an end because the
combined market share of the participating parties exceeded 50% of the
relevant market, making them prohibited mergers under the Competition
Law of Vietnam.341 This practice of merger control by the VCA suggests
that the second viewpoint on the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the
Competition Law of Vietnam has become the primary approach in
Vietnam. The law therefore regulates not only conduct in Vietnam, but
also conduct in a foreign territory that has an effect on the Vietnamese
market.
The effects doctrine in Vietnam, however, is not clearly defined, as
there is neither an official guideline nor a judgment stating the limits of
the extraterritorial jurisdiction. In reality, the practical exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction in Vietnam is not as aggressive as that of other
countries. The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction relies heavily on the
compliance of MNCs. Moreover, there has been no case where foreign law
has been enforced with respect to conduct in Vietnam. Thus, the degree of
Vietnamese government opposition to such an exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction is unclear. Vietnam should clarify the scope of the
extraterritorial application of the Competition Law of Vietnam to provide
clear guidelines for foreign companies doing business in Vietnam. Such
limits should aim to reduce possible conflicts between Vietnam and
foreign countries in cross-border competition cases.
CO., https://www.msc.com/che/contact-us?showHQ=true [https://perma.cc/LT
7G-EF3E] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
337. REPORT ON ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION, supra note 326, at 53.
338. Id.
339. The P3 Network Will Not Be Implemented Following Decision by the
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) in China, MAERSK LINE (June 17, 2014),
http://www.maerskline.com/de-ch/countries/int/news/news-articles/2014/06/p3network [https://perma.cc/XXJ4-BKRE].
340. Abott acquired CFR. See REPORT ON ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION, supra
note 326, at 54.
341. Luật Cạnh Tranh [Competition Law], No. 27/2004/QH11 of Dec. 3, 2004,
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E. Comparing the Approaches
An analysis of international law indicates that the extraterritorial
application of competition law by a state to conduct outside its territory is
not contrary to international law if that extraterritorial application is
properly limited. However, a state’s competition law should be applied
extraterritorially only if countries fail to find a common solution for a
cross-border competition issue. Before applying its competition law
extraterritorially, a country should take into account the legislation, law
enforcement, and national interest of other relevant countries. The
effectiveness of this approach strongly depends on interstate
communication given the different approaches to the EACL.
Canada consistently relies on the territorial principle in applying its
competition law. Although sections 109 and 110 of the Competition Act342
provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction for merger control, Canada
practically confines the enforcement of the Act to its territory.
Additionally, Canada has enacted statutes that resist the enforcement of
foreign competition law in Canada. In contrast, the U.S. vigorously
exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction in the area of competition law. U.S.
antitrust law is applied to any conduct that takes place abroad and that has a
direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. trade or
commerce. Courts in the U.S. must, however, consider the interests of
foreign countries, international comity, and the sovereign immunity doctrine
when deciding whether to apply U.S. antitrust law extraterritorially. The
U.S. also does not oppose the extraterritorial application of foreign
competition law in its territory. The approach to the EACL in the U.S. is
thus internally consistent.
Japan, unlike the U.S., Canada, and Vietnam, is a country which has
adopted a double standard toward the EACL. On the one hand, Japan applies
its competition law, the AMA, to business transactions conducted in foreign
territory that substantially restrain competition within Japanese territory.
Japan arguably adopts the effects doctrine more aggressively than the
United States does. Although the U.S. considers only direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effects, Japan considers acts conducted abroad that
have indirect effects on the Japanese market. On the other hand, Japan
strongly opposes the application of foreign competition law to conduct in
Japanese territory. Unlike the U.S. and Canada, Japan employs an internally
inconsistent approach to the EACL, which might cause conflict between
countries in cross-border competition cases.

342. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34 (Can.).
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Finally, Vietnam is a developing country that has been enforcing
competition law for only ten years. Although there are two contrasting
opinions on the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Competition Law of
Vietnam,343 the practice of merger control indicates that Vietnam is
shifting its approach to favor the extraterritorial principle when applying
its competition law. The practical application of Vietnamese competition
law to mergers conducted completely abroad by foreign companies
suggests that the effects doctrine is not simply the privilege of a powerful
country, but a doctrine that a small, developing country can effectively
employ. Like the U.S., Vietnam does not oppose the application of foreign
competition law to conduct that takes place in Vietnam.
III. THE PROPOSED APPROACH TO EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
This comparative study of the EACL highlights the disjointed
approaches to extraterritorial jurisdiction. To facilitate both international
and intra-national business transactions, countries should adopt a clearer
model for the extraterritorial application of their competition law—one that
allows countries to protect their markets while encouraging cooperation
among all countries involved. This model should apply not only externally,
to the extraterritorial application of a country’s competition law, but also
internally, to the exercise of foreign competition law to conduct in its own
territory. This would eliminate the EACL double standard of some countries
that extend the reach of their competition law to foreign territories but reject
the application of foreign law to conduct in their own territory.
Thus this Article proposes a series of pertinent questions that a country
should consider when determining the extraterritorial jurisdiction of its
competition law and the application of another country’s competition law in
its territory. The first set of questions focuses on the conduct that occurred.
First, did the person or entity conducting the business transaction intend to
violate an obligation set by the country of forum? Second, how did, or how
will, the transaction harm the country of forum? Third, did the person or
entity engage in the transaction pursuant to the direction or compulsion of
the home country?
Similar to the effects test in Alcoa, the first two questions are necessary
to analyze the link between the transaction in question and the country that
wishes to apply its law extraterritorially. In a competition case, the intent
and the effects are closely related. Countries should not exercise jurisdiction
over conduct abroad when the person or entity had no intent to violate the
343. See Luật Cạnh Tranh [Competition Law], No. 27/2004/QH11 of Dec. 3,
2004, art. 18 (Viet.).
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law of the country of forum, or if the conduct had no effect on the country
of forum. The third question considers the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
ensuring that a country does not overreach its jurisdiction and apply it to the
actions of another sovereign.
The second set of questions relevant to the inquiry of extraterritorial
jurisdiction relates to the procedure in the home country. First, does the
home country have a similar law? Second, did the country where the
business transaction occurred take any legal measure to control or sanction
the transaction? Third, did the sanction or measure take into account the
interest of the country of forum? Finally, did the home country try to
cooperate with the country of forum when deciding the case? These
questions analyze whether the country where the transaction takes place
seeks to prevent such harmful conduct and whether the countries are
sufficiently cooperating and considering the interest of the country of forum.
The final set of questions relates to the procedure in the country of
forum. First, did the country of forum attempt to cooperate with the home
country before proceeding in the case? Second, does the country of forum
give the person or entity involved in the transaction the opportunity to
participate in the judgment? And finally, does the country of forum take into
account the interests of the home country? Like the second set of questions,
these questions seek to encourage cooperation among the countries before
taking any action unilaterally. Additionally, this set of questions ensures that
the country of forum applies its competition law extraterritorially with
transparency and using due process. Each set of questions considers key
elements of extraterritorial jurisdiction, as currently applied by various
countries, and ensures that the highest level of cooperation and effectiveness
is met when exercising the extraterritorial application of competition law.
CONCLUSION
By analyzing the key attributes of the EACL and the practical
approaches of different countries, this Article proposes the proper approach
to the EACL that every country should adopt. This approach contains a
series of pertinent questions that a country should consider when faced with
an issue of EACL. This approach relies on the effects doctrine rather than
other exceptions to the territorial principle. This approach also takes into
account sovereign immunity as directed by international law. The exercise
of extraterritorial jurisdiction does not violate international law when the
exercise is confined to the effects within a country’s territory and when the
exercise is necessary to protect a country’s interests.

